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ABSTRACT
The Arctic Polar Region is becoming increasingly important in terms
of strategic operations. especially on the part of the superpowers.
Surrounding the Arctic Ocean are two passages through which
international navigation is possible. The Northwest Passage lies within
Canada's coastline. and the Northeast Passage. within the Soviet Union's
northern shores.
Both countries have advanced claims to the effect that the waters
of these passages are under their respective exclusive jurisdiction;
thus. they are claiming these as their internal waters. The US
disagrees and maintains that the waters of those northern Arctic sea
routes are international waters.
This paper discusses the Canadian and Soviet positions with respect
to their individual claims; the basis of their international legal
argumentation is also reviewed. The similarities and contrasts are
highlighted in an analysis of both situations. A survey of American
position is undertaken in terms of US stated policies and practice with
regard to the Northwest and Northeast Passages.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE ARCTIC REGION
Introduction
The Arctic Region has evoked. for many and for years. the fanciful
imagery of a cold. silent and perilous habitat in the distant far
North. The natural serenity of this inhospitable environment was
disturbed only by the regular hunting capers of the Inuit. the sporadic
expeditions of explorers and adventurers. and the infrequent
fact-finding missions of scientists.
In recent times. scientific research and technological developments
have not only confirmed the resourcefulness of the Arctic Basin. but
also have rendered its exploration less difficult. Bygone are the days
when the harsh Arctic winds and the ice-clogged waterways made any
traversings of the Canadian Northwest Passage or the Soviet National
Northern Sea Route a formidable task and heroic event. Huge icebreakers
are capable of plowing easily through six meters of multi-year ice.
making navigation possible in this polar region.
The Northwest Passage (NWP) which Canada claims to be an intrinsic
element of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. and the Northeast Passage
(~~p)l which borders the Soviet Arctic coastline. can serve as
navigation routes linking. in both instances. the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans. and. thus. conferring upon both waterways their commercial and
1
strategic significance. However. both Canada and the Soviet Union
contend that these passages are not international sea routes. but rather
that they are within the countries' exclusive jurisdiction. as are the
internal waters of a sovereign state.
The absence of an internationally accepted Arctic legal regime has
thus left the Northern frontier vulnerable to territorial claims by the
bordering coastal states. Further. the lack of acquiescence of the
Arctic rim states towards each others' claims increases the
probabilities for the once-ignored wasteland to become an arena of
international conflict especially between the superpowers. the United
States and the Soviet Union.
In order to gain a better understanding of the present state of the
Canadian and Soviet claims to the waters of the Arctic Passages. this
study begins with a brief review of the geopolitics of the Arctic.
The Geopolitics of the Arctic
Over the last two decades. the Arctic Region has been the object of
increasingly animated discussion related to either territorial
delimitations or the rights of the Arctic rim states in this circumpolar
region. The discovery of huge hydrocarbon deposits and the undertaking
of subsequent exploitation activities. combined with the military
significance of the Arctic. have heightened the interests of the
superpowers as well as the concerns of the other Arctic rim states.
One of the most unique features of the Arctic Ocean is its frozen
seawater which forms an ice cover at the North Pole:
2
The ice pack goes through a seasonal cycle of surface
melt amounting to about one meter and bottom
replenishment by a like amount ..• [T]he central
Arctic Basin is within the zone of perennial ice
cover'2excepting only the relatively narrow coastal
areas.
The periphery of the Arctic Ocean basin is shared in various
lengths of coastlines by five countries: the USSR, Canada, the United
States, Denmark (Greenland), and Norway, in that order3 (see Map 1).
The Ocean Basin has kindled the interest of the bordering coastal
states with its promise of considerable economic benefits through the
exploitation of hydrocarbons resources. Further, the prospect of
significant strategic advantage through the deployment of a
sophisticated weaponry has caught the imagination of the superpowers:
Recent developments in military technology are rapidly
turning the Arctic region into one of the world's most
active and important areas of military operations •••
The Far North also is rapidly industrializing and
therefore becomi~g critically important to US and
Soviet security.
Indeed, no longer is the Arctic considered a vast frozen and barren
wasteland. Rather, it is seen as one of the world's most vital areas of
strategic operations and one of the globe's richest reservoirs of oil
d d . 5an gas epos~ts. The awareness of those vast natural resources
together with the technological know-how to exploit them on a commercial
basis have stirred the eagerness of Arctic rim states in their
exploitation:
1.6-1.7 million barrels of oil are produced daily at
Prudhoe Bay •••• Some estimates put additional
recoverable reserves of oil in the North American
Arctic at 50 billion or more barrels. The region's
recoverable reserves of natural gas amount to more
than 300 trillion cubic feet, though lack of a
transportatiog system has so far prevented commercial
exploitation.
3
Map 1 - The Arctic Region
Source: Dosman, Edgar J: The Arctic
in Question (1976); Oxford
University Press (Toronto);
206 pages; insert.
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WhiJe the Soviet Arctic may not be as well endowed with oil deposits.
its "natural gas reserves may amount to 500 trillion cubic feet"; 7 the
Soviet Northern region has also huge deposits of gold. coal and other
minerals. Already. the NWP is being contemplated as the waterway to be
used for commercial Arctic hydrocarbon resources. 8 Insofar as the
Soviet Arctic is concerned. the NEP has been in operation for quite some
. 9
t a.me•
But foremost. the Arctic Region possesses an intrinsic military
significance. for it is difficult to ignore the fact that the world's
superpowers are practically at each others' doorstep in the Arctic: at
the Bering Strait. Alaska is 57 miles from Eastern Siberia. Moreover.
in terms of NATO considerations. the fact that the Denmark Strait and
the Norwegian Sea are main exit routes for USSR vessels into the
Atlantic Ocean does impact on the Alliance's defense strategies:
The north polar region is the shortest route the
Soviet Union could take to the United States and
Canada in the event of a war between the superpowers.
It thus would be the favored route for long-range
strategic aircraft deployed out of the Soviet Far
East. East Siberia. and from the complex of bases in
the Kola Peninsula. w~&ch houses the largest naval
complex in the world.
A major military consideration in this Region is the sophistication
of strategic capabilities that has been developed in the recent decades.
The US and USSR are equipped with high-flying aircrafts. missiles and
nuclear-powered submarines that present the potential for mutual
destruction. The dangers for ecological disasters are omnipresent. even
if no actual military encounter takes place: accidents do happen •
5
Statement of Purpose
The present study seeks to enlarge the understanding of the
international legal basis upon which Canada and the Soviet Union rest
their claims to their respective northern coastal sea routes. and to
observe similarities and contrasts in their positions. Both the
Canadian and Soviet claims will be studied in light of the provisions of
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The American position will be
reviewed with respect to the stand taken by Canada and the Soviet Union.
before the presentation of summary conclusions.
6
CHAPTER TWO
THE CANADIAN CLAIMS TO THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE
Canada encompasses an exceptionally large mass of waters and
islands within the Arctic Circle. and has always maintained that the
waters of the tMP are internal waters of Canada. The examination of the
location and possible routes of the NWP. the traditional Canadian stand
on this question as well as the international legal basis upon which
these waters can be deemed "internal" or "international" will provide
for a better understanding of the various issues related to the Canadian
claims to the NWP.
The Northwest Passage: Location and Routes
The NWP is described as the waterway that "spans the North American
Arctic from the Davis Strait and Baffin Bay in the east to the Bering
Strait in the west."ll It is the waterway that European explorers1 2
sought for centuries and through which they could reach India and
China. The NWP includes the water route within the Canadian Arctic
Archipelago between the Beaufort Sea in the west and the Baffin Bay in
the east.
There are five potentially navigable routes through the NWP and two
variations of Routes 3 and 5. Route 3A and 5A (see Map 2). Except for
Route 5 and 5A. the eastern entrance or exit is the Lancaster Sound.
7
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Since then.
which is 45 miles wide and 165 miles long. because it is where the ice
conditions make it less difficult for navigation: while for the western
entr&nce or exit. the M'Clure Strait (70 miles in width and 180 miles
long) and the Prince of Wales Strait are the best suited. Route 3
ent ers or exits westward in the Gulf of Amundsen.
In considering which route to take. navigators need to take into
account the geography. the ice conditions and the bathymetry.
Experience had demonstrated that Route 1 (through Prince of Wales
Strait) and Route 2 (through M'Clure Strait) offer the best courses for
deep draft navigation. Further. the choice of waterway "depends on the
size and strength of the vessels employed. on the nature and purpose of
13the voyage with general and local ice conditions in any given year."
Canada's Position Over the Years
In discerning Canada's position on the issue of the nature of the
waters of the NWP. it is important to take note of how Canada gained
title to the Arctic Archipelago. In 1870 and 1880. Great Britain
d · . I h A . . I d 14transferred to Cana a ~ts t~t e over t e rct~c ~s an s.
sovereignty has been exercised. achieved and consolidated by official
Canadian explorations and patrol expeditions in the early 1900's and by
the conduct of state activities by government officials. especially by
members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 15
Associated with the exercise of its sovereignty over the Arctic
Archipelago was Canada's early espousal of the Arctic Sector theory. As
early as 1904. the Canadian Department of the Interior maps included as
9
Canadian. all the land contained between the 141st western and the 60th
16
eastern meridians to the North Pole.
Thereafter. and on a regular basis. government officials. ministers
and Prime Minis tel'S have asse rt ed , in unequivocal terms. Canada's
sovereignty over the islands and waters of the Canadian Arctic
Archipelago. In a speech to the House of Commons on May 15. 1969. the
Rt. Bon. Pierre Elliot Trudeau declared:
Canada' s sovereignty over its Arctic regions including
the islands of the Arctic archipelago is well
established •.• The Arctic island s and mainland form
an integral part of Canada and we have extended to
them the administrative. legislative and jUdici!~
framework which applies to all parts of Canada.
And in particular reference to the Manhattan "incident."18 the Prime
Hinister quoted the words of a former minister of Northern Affairs. the
Ho n , Alvin Hamilton who. in 1958. had stressed that "the area to the
north of Canada. including the islands and the waters between the
islands and beyond. are looked upon as our own. and there is no doubt in
the mind of this government [the Diefenbaker Government] that this is
. 1 . ,,19nat~ona terra~n.
Hore recently. in responding to questions on the Polar Sea
20
voyage through the NWP. the Prime Minister of Canada. the Rt , Ho n ,
Brian Mulroney was no less direct:
There is no doubt that the Northwest Passage and that
part of the world belongs to Canada ••. It is ours.
We assert our s-ove re i.gn ty over it... [The Northwest
Passage] belongs to Canada lock. stock and barrel ..•
And the government of 2tnada will continue to ensure
that that is the case.
Should there have been any doubts as to where Canada stands in 1985 on
the issue. that declarction unquestionably clarifies the government's
10
position: Canada considers the NWP waterway as part of its internal
waters
22
and is prepared to undertake the measures required to ascer-
tain that they are and remain so. The intent is therefore clear. and
the implementation of appropriate and effective actions has been
decided. 23
The effect of the Canadian position is that when considered part of
Canada's internal waters. the NWP and the airspace above it are subject
to the total jurisdiction of the sovereign state. The resulting impli-
cations are that the sovereign state may grant or refuse authorization
to any vessel wanting to navigate in those 'internal' waters.
There is no doubt as to the clarity and firmness of the position of
Canada. In trying to elucidate the Canadian argumentation. a better
comprehension can be sought through the review of pertinent legislative
enactments and the consideration of several relevant international legal
principles.
Relevant Legislative Measures to the Canadian Claims
The examination of the different elements constituting the Canadian
legal position surrounding the Arctic claims warrants. in a first
instance. a survey of Canadian state practice through domestic legis la-
tion. It should be noted that the 1969 Manhattan challenge hastened the
Government to take legislative measures to asseverate the firmness of
its position with respect to Canadian sovereignty over the waters of the
Canadian Arctic Region.
11
The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention (AWPP) Act of 1970 subjected
foreign navigation to Canadian regulation s governing the design.
const ruction. manning and safety of vessels operating in Canadian
waters, and provided for a pollution control of zone of 100 n. miles
around the Arctic Archipelago. 24
Shortly thereafter. followed the establishment of the 200 nautical
mile Exclusive Fisheries Zone (EFZ) around Canada's eastern western and
northern coastline (see Map 3). This jurisdictional claim did not
require any new enactment since the enabling legislation, the 1970
Amendment to the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act (TSFZ), provided
for the extension of fishing zones or the territorial sea by way of
Order-in-Council. 25 One was adopted in 1976 to establish the 200 miles
EFZ which is oeviously applicable in the Arctic as it is along the
Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Canada. The Canadian decision to
establish an EFZ conforms with widely accepted state practice, both in
customary and international law.
It is worthy to underline that the 1970 Amendment to the TSFZ Act
does provide for a definition of 'internal' waters:
internal waters of Canada include any areas of the sea
that are on the landward s~ge of the baselines of the
territorial sea of Canada.
This provision has raised discussions among legal experts as to its
meaning in the absence of baselines and in light of the definition of
internal waters as circumscribed in the amended Customs Act of 1970:
internal waters of Canada means (a) any areas of the
sea that are on the landward side of the baselines of
the territorial sz7 of Canada, and (b) the inland
waters of Canada.
12
Source: Dosrnan, E.J.: Ibid.; insert.
The 100 Mile Arctic Pollution Zone
and 200 Mile Exclusive Fisheries
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The problems relate to "means" and the "absence of baselines": if
"means" implies "to be" and there are "no baselines". then. "there can
be no waters that fit within the Customs Act definition of internal
28
waters of Canada. except inland waters.
Insofar as the TSFZ definition is concerned it is wider in scope.
as the word "include" is utilized,: "the internal waters of Canada
include waters on the landward side of the baselines. and a fortiori can
29
also include waters where no baselines have been made." Further. the
establishment of baselines would thus remove any ambiguity.
More recently. on September 10. 1985. the Government of Canada
announced its intention to adopt immediately a Canadian Laws Application
Act. which extends "the application of Canadian civil and criminal law
to offshore areas".30 including the Arctic. Furthermore. on the very
same day. the Government. by virtue of an Order-in-council cited as
Territorial Sea Geographical Coordinates (Area 7) Order. announced the
bl ' hm f ' h b l' 31 d h A . A h' 1esta ~s ent 0 stralg t ase lnes aroun t e rctlc rc lpe ago.
This measure will be discussed at greater length under a separate
heading later in this chapter.
These measures constitute Canada's reassertion of its Arctic
waters' claim over the last sixteen years. They were brought forth as a
result of the 1969 Manhattan incident and the US Polar Sea challenge of
August 1985; they emphatically state the Government's intent to maintain
exclusive jurisdictional control over the waters of the Arctic
Archipelago.
Politicians. government officials and publicists have made
pronouncements over the years in relation to the international legal
14
basis of Canada's Arctic claims. The Arctic Sector theory presented
itself. at the early stages. as the empowering notion to sustain the
Canadian state' s claims.
Arctic Sector Theory
In the beginning of the twentieth century. the sector theory
emerged as the effective tool to elude the internationally recognized
requirement of lief fective occupation" by a sovereign state to the barren
polar region areas. It was first propounded by a Canadian Senator.
Pascal Poirier. in a speech before the Senate in 1907:
We have a fourth claim. we can establish a
fourth ground for ownership of all the lands' and
islands that extend from the arctic circle up to the
north pole. Last year. I think it was. when our
Captain Bernier [a noted arctic explorer of that
day] was in New York. a guest of the Arctic Club.
the question being mooted as to the ownership of the
Arctic islands. it was proposed and agreed - and
this is not a novel affair - that in future
partition. of northern lands. a country whose
possession today goes up to the Arctic regions. will
have a right. or should have a right. or has a right
to all the lands that are to be found in the waters
between a line extending from its eastern extremity
north. and another line from the western extremity
north. All the lands between the two lines up to
the north pole should belong to the country whose
territory abuts up there ••• From 141 to 60 degrees
west we are on Canadian territory.
And the Senator had a premonition of the jurisdictional problems that
could arise:
•••This part~t~on of the polar regions seems to me
to be the most natural. because it is only a
geographical one. By that means difficulties would
be avoided. and there would be no cause for trouble
between interested countries. Every country
15
bordering on the Arctic r egion s wou112simply extend
its possession up to the North pole.
The s e c tor theory has not. however. received any enthusiastic support
from international legal experts. Nonetheless. it has been referred to by
officials and politicians over the years. As Canadian Ambassador to the
United States in 1946. - and later Prime Minister of Canada - the Right
Honourable Lester B. Pearson stated that the Canadian claim
includes not only Canada's northern mainland but the
i slands and frozen sea north of the meridia~3of its
east and west boundaries to the North Pole.
An official sector claim to sovereignty over northern ice and waters has
never been made. It should be noted that the Canadian Arctic sector
"has appeared on Canadian maps of the North from 1904 to the present."
and that "this principle has been considered by the government of Canada
as a possible basis for dividing the continental shelf it shares with
Denmark off the west coast of Greenland and with the United States in
34
the Beaufort Sea."
The Right Honourable P.E. Trudeau did assert that "the sector
theory applied only to the continental shelf and the seabed. not to
water and ice. "35 Canada has persistently appeared to claim title to
the ice. but in an obscure and ambiguous manner. On April 29. 1970 the
Director of Legal Service in External Affairs asserted that "the theory
that ice is part of the territory has certainly not been abandoned nor
36forgotten."
Nonetheless. Canada has advocated a claim "to a maritime boundary
on its west at the 141 degree west longitude meridian". also the
Canadian outer continental shelf program and the 1970 AWPP refer to lithe
141st meridian" for their application. 3 7
16
It is interesting to note that a Canadian government publication.
dated 1980. refers to the sector theory in the following terms:
Senate Pascal Poirier enunciated his sector principle
or theory in the Canadian Senate on February 20. 1907.
thus articulating in clear terms a proposition that
Captain Bernier had been voiding for some time. and at
the same time giving it what is still regarded as its
classic expression - It soon be3~me at least
semi-official Canadian policy."
Insofar as a basis for the Canadian claims. and since the sector
theory has neither been denied or invoked officially by successive
Canadian governments. it may be why some publicists give the following
interpretation:
The position of the present government seems to be
that the sector theory should be held in reserve as a
possible support. and that nothing should be done3~0
undermine any possible legal value it might have.
Cognizant of the fact that the sector theory has not received
international acceptance. notably through the UNLOS III deliberations.
the Canadian government and publicists have put forth other legal bases
of reasoning to substantiate the Canadian Arctic waters claim. notably
the basis of history.
Historical Basis
Canadian experts think that Canada does have a right of title to
the NWP passage waters on the basis of history. and that US challenges
endanger Canada's position:
It is submitted that ••• sufficient time has endured for
Canadian sovereignty over the entire Canadian Arctic
as far as the North Pole. and embracing land island.
sea and packed ice. Had any question arisen say five
years before the Manhattan effort. it is little doubt
17
that the world at large would hav~orecognized Canada's
historic title to the whole area.
It i s also the thinking of the Government of Canada. The Lpgal
Adviser's office in the Department of Ext ernal Affairs offered in
December 1973, the f oLk owLng opinion:
the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are
internal water s o f Canada, on an historical basis
although they have not been d~~lared a s such in any
treaty or by any legislation.
While explaining the implications of the new tran sit passage regime
for international straits as discussed at UNCLOS III, the External
Affairs Minister, in May. 1975, appears to support this contention:
As Canada's Northwest Passage is not used for
international navigation and since the Arctic waters
are considered by Canada as being internal wate4~' the
regime of transit does not apply to the Arctic.
Also Canada has claimed that the waters of the Gulf of St. Lawrence are
. 1 d 1 Cd' . . d i . 43lnterna waters un er comp ete ana lan Jurls lctlon.
Again more recently, the External Affairs Minister in his statement
on Arctic sovereignty declared in the House of Commons, when he was
announcing the establishment of straight baselines, that "these
baselines define the outer limit of Canada's historic waters".44
To establish claims on the basis of history, it is important to
seek precedents in customary law or in state practice, and to examine
the relevant provisions of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea;
these will be reviewed in chapter four.
18
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Straight Baselines Regime
The establishment of s t r a i g h t baselines ( see Map 4) around the
Arctic Archipe1ag04 5 has the effect of surrendering all waters and
s e a rou t e s , cont.ained within the pe r in.e t e r thus created. under the
complet.e jurisdiction of the sovereign state. Such measures make the
waters of the NWP part of the int ernal waters of Canada.
The legal basis of such action is derived from the judgment of the
46International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case.
when Norway was allowed to draw straight baselines around its
archipelago known as t.he skjaergaard. The straight baseline system was
upheld by the Court as being applicable t.o a state with a deeply
indented coast o r "if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in
. . d i ." "471tS 1mme 1ate v1c1n1ty.
As a result of the Norway-L~ Court ruling. three basic criteria
establishing straight baselines were retained in the 1958 Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and the 1982 Convention on
48the Law of the Sea. The straight baselines must not depart to an
appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast. implying
that 2ny deviation must not create a distortion of the general
d i , 491rect10n. Also. the enclosed sea area had to have been so closely
linked to the mainland so as to be subject to the internal waters
regime. 5 0 And finally. the establishment of such baselines must tro{e
into account "the econcmic interests peculiar to the region concerned.
the reality and importance of which are clearly evidenced by long
51
usage."
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The application of those criteria can give credence to the straight
baselines drawn around the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. A global
examination of a small-scale map as in Map 4 reveals no major distortion
of the general direction of the coast. Insofar as the linkage of the
enclosed waters to the land is concerned. it is important to bear in
mind that in the Norwegian case. the ratio of the area of water to that
of the land was 3.5 to 1. In the Canadian Arctic Archipelago situation.
52the estimated ratio is .882 to 1. Finally. the dependence of the
Inuit population on fishing. hunting and trapping in that frozen milieu
constitute sufficient "peculiar econanic interests" to warrant such
. h b 1· 53 . 11 h Am d G 1f d Lstralg t ase lnes. espeCla y at t e un sen u an ancaster
Sound areas.
Although the Canadian Arctic Archipelago is not what could be
called "a fringe of islands". it does form nonetheless a single unit of
islands and headlands. broken by large indentations of bays and gulfs.
woven together by straits and sounds. and held in a unit by the frozen
ice of the Archipelago. which altogether forms an integral part of the
54Canadian coast. Some experts hold the view that the "fringe of
islands" notion needs not be interpreted in the strictest literal sense.
especially in light of state practice:
The [Canadian Arctic] archipelago might not constitute
a 'fringe of islands along the coast'. if the
conventions are interpreted literally. but such an
interpretation would not be in accord with the
practice of states ••• Professor O'Connell lists some
eighteen coastal archipelagos where straight baselines
were used a~3 which constitute very doubtful 'fringes'
of islands.
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The implication of the Canadian government decision to go forward in
establishing straight baselines has the effect of enclosing all waters of
the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. including those of the ~~p. as internal
waters. Further, both the 1958 and the 1982 conventions provide that
where "the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not been
previously considered as such, a right of innocent passage shall exist in
56those waters." Canada has never recognized the NWP as international
waters, but Canada has acknowledged officially its intention of
maintaining open the NWP to international navigation: "to close off those
waters and deny passage to all foreign sovereignty, as some commentators
have suggested, would be as senseless as placing barriers across the
entrances of Halifax and Vancouver harbours,,57 but under stringent
environmental protection regulations:
Canada continues to maintain ••• that any navigation in
the Passage will be subject to Canadian control a~~
regulation for safety and environmental purposes.
Conclusion
The succinct review of the location and strategic importance of the
Northwest Passage. the more detailed study of the applicability of
international legal principles to Canada's longstanding claims of
sovereignty over the Passage and its waters. and the survey of Canada's
latest course of action in asserting its sovereignty, have not only
highlighted the complexity of some of the issues involved, but also
attempted to assess the validity of Canada's "controversial" claims.
22
But for the Government of Canada. sovereignty over the Arctic land.
water and ice. including those waters of the NWP. remains indivisible
and unquestionable:
It embraces land. sea. and ice. It extends without
interruption to the seaward - facing coasts of the
Arctic islands. These islands are joined and not
divided by waters between the~. They are bridged for
most of the year by ice. From time immemorial Canada's
Inuit people have used and occupied the ice as they have
used and occupied the land.
The policy of this government is to maintain the
natural unity of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. and to
preserve Canada's sovereignty over land. sea. and ice
undiminished and undivided.
The Arctic is a heritage for the.peop1e o~ Ca~~da.
They are determined to keep their herltage entlre.
Canada has successfully defended the uniqueness of its Arctic
Region before the international community. The inclusion of article 234
on "ice-covered areas" in the 1982 Convention (see Appendix E) gives
recognition to its 1970 AWPP legislation. Coastal states can introduce
stringent measures governing marine pollution from vessels in such
fragile and unique environment. and that. within the limits of their 200
nautical miles exclusive economic zone.
Viewed in the context of the most recent US Polar Sea voyage. it
follows that the "ice-covered areas" provision may not have afforded
Canada with the required protection for its ecologically unique region.
The straight baselines were drawn to establish clearly Canadian
sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic Archipelago. protecting not
only the Arctic environment. but also the Inuit population and its
national security interests. The Government of Canada had no choice but
to act. For the protection of the sovereignty and the territorial
integrity of the state is inherent to the mandate of any government.
23
CHAPTER THREE
SOVIET CLAIMS TO THE NORTHEAST PASSAGE
The Soviet Union is the circumpolar state with the lcngest Arctic
coastline. along which lies the National Northern Sea Route. This
chapter will review the various facets of the Soviet claims. examining
first the nature and location of the Northeast Passage. The Soviet
position. with its resulting implications. will precede a discussion of
the different components of the USSR legal basis for its claim of
internal waters status for the NNSR.
The Northeast Passage: Its Location and Characteristics
The National Northern Sea Route (NNSR) is located in the bordering
Arctic waters of the Soviet Union's northern coastline and stretches
between the 32 004'35" East to 168°49'30" West. 60 The NNSR is a
navigable route which is comprised of a series of straits between the
Barents. Ka ra.• Lap t ev , East Siberian and the Chuckchi Seas. The
Northeast Passage thus links the Pacific Ocean (through the Bering
Strait at the Chuckchi Sea) with the Atlantic Ocean (through the
Norwegian Sea adjacent to the Barents Sea). (See Map 5) It includes
the straits of Karskiye Vrota (between Novai Zemlia Island and Ostrov
Vagach Island). Vil'Kitskii (between Severnaia Zemlia and the Polustrov
Peninsula). those of Sanikova. and Dmitria Lapteva (joining the Laptev
24
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Map 5 - The National No r t he r n Sea Route
Source: Butler, Ibid.; p. 4.
and East Sibe rian Seas), and the Longa Strait (between Wrangle Island
and the Northeastern peninsula) leadir.g to the Bering Strait via the
Chuckchi Sea.
6 1
The Soviet National Northern Sea Route, also kn~ln as
the Northeast Passage, has also been described as follows:
Starting from Murmansk, the main lane runs through the
Barents Sea, passing North of Novaya Zemlya, and
proceeds across the Kara Sea into the Vilkitsky
Straits of Severnaya Zemlys; ... the route traverses
the Laptev Sea and doubles into a southern lane
through the Dimitri Laptev Strait, and into a northern
one through the Sannikov Strait, both of which lead
into the East Siberian Sea. There. the route divides
again to pass on either side of the small Medvezhy
Islands; it then resumes as a single land along the
coast south of Wrangle Island'6~nto the Chuckchi Sea
and through the Bering Strait.
Navigation in the ~ffiP depends upon the geographical characteristics
of the straits themselves. Since full Soviet data and charts are not
readily made available, foreign attempts to navigate the NNSR need to
rely on sailing directions compiled by the U.S. Naval Oceanographic
63Office and the Hydrographer of the Royal Navy (UK). Further.
considerations for navigation require knowledge of the depth of the
waters, of whether or not ice is present, of the thickness of the ice,
and the width of straits involved. Reality is that there are persistent
difficult ice conditions that make it advantageous and almost compulsory
to go through the Vil'Kitskii Straits. 64 which are considered by the
Soviets as the internal waters of the USSR.
The Soviet Position Over Years
In examining the Soviet claims in the Arctic Region and those
relating to the NNSR in particular, it is imperative to focus on a
26
serie s of Soviet doctrinal theories that have been developed over the
years:
Although the practice of the USSR indicates that it
considers the Northern Sea Route a national route, it
has not adopted any law to that effect; it has,
however, adopted a number of laws and decrees relating
to its jurisdiction over certain lands and bouggary
waters which have relevance to that sea route.
In other words, the "Soviets have constructed a body of doctrinal
claims which are at variance with Western norms of international sea law
. . f . . 1166on s~gn~ ~cant ~ssues. These Soviet claims and positions have been
embodied in legislative enactments and policy pronouncements. In 1909,
Imperial Russia claimed a 12 mile jurisdiction off its coastline for
purposes of custom control. Shortly after the Revolution, the USSR
established, in 1921, a 12 mile fishing zone; in 1926, the Soviet
government decreed the Arctic sector theory principle. Subsequently,
there were other measures introduced. It could be argued that the
legislative measures of the last twenty years were implemented as a
reaction to the American challenges of the National Northern Sea Route.
In the 1967 US attempt, the Soviet position was unequivocal and firm,
and was relayed to the US vessel seeking to go through the Vilkitskii
Straits:
••• Vilkitskii Strait is within USSR territorial waters
therefore sailing of any foreign navy ships in the
strait is subject to regulations of safety of USSR
frontiers. For passing the strait according to the
above regulations military ships must obtain
preliminary permission of USSR Government through
dipl~mat~7 channels one month before expected date of
pass~ng.
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The Soviets deny that the NNSR wat ers are international waters. affirm
that they a re internal, and that these waters are under the complete
exclusive jurisdiction of the state.
For this reason, any attempt to better understand the USSR position
requires the scrutiny of both the legislative enactments, as well as the
prevailing Soviet international legal opinions and concepts. since
official Soviet statements are seldom made. It 1S through a series of
overlapping legal doctrines that the Soviet Union has formulated the
position that the National Northern Sea Route is not only a national
commercial waterway that belongs solely to the USSR, but a passageway
which is open to foreign shippers only on Soviet terms and conditions,
including Soviet navigational directives and the payment of transit
68fees. The Soviet Union thus considers the Northeast passage as a
national route under the total control of the state.
Soviet Legislative Measures
Prior to the Soviet ratification of the 1958 Convention on the
Territorial Sea, the USSR established in 1960, a twelve mile territorial
sea for the first time; the 1960 Soviet statute was amended in 1971. 69
Also, in 1965, the USSR Ministry of the Maritime Fleet rendered
manda tory, II icebreaker escort or pilotage 'for all vessels' II in the
Vilkitskii and Shokal'skii straits and in the Sannikov and Dmitriya
Laptev straits. 70 In 1971. the Soviet Council of Ministers formally
emp owe r ed the Administration of the Northern Sea Route lito regulate the
movement of vessels ll7 1 in the Northeast Passage, to "fix areas where
icebreaker escorts and/or pilot are obligatory. ,,72
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As noted above. at the beginning of the twentieth century.
enactments dealing with the emerging problems of sea control were
adopted and enforced. Most recently. there have been legislative
enactments decreed by the Soviet authorities to update its domestic
legal regime to the new 1982 Convention. The 1983 Rules for Navigation
and Sojourn of Foreign Warships in Territorial and Internal Waters and
Ports of the USSR73
The 1983 Rules allow for warships to travel through Soviet waters
(territorial or internal) according to stated USSR conditions: foreign
warships a) will fly their state flag (art. 2); b) observe "radio
communications. navigational. port. customs. sanitary. and other rules
(art. 4); c) will immediately notify the administration of the nearest
Soviet port in the case of forced non-observance of rules (art. 4); d)
must use Soviet pilotage and icebreaker services (art. 5); e) must avoid
any areas prohibited for navigation by the USSR as announced in Notices
to Mariners (art. 6); f) must observe rules. the failure of which will
trigger a Soviet request to comply and. in the absence of compliance. a
Soviet demand to leave the limits of the USSR territory (art. 7).
Further. the 1983 Rules allow for innocent passage of foreign war-
ships in USSR territorial waters (art. 8) as long as "it does not breach
the peace. good order. or security of the USSR" and it is "c on td.nuou s
and exped i.t Lons" (art. 10). The conditions for innocent passage (art.
11) are in line with those of the 1982 Convention of the Law of the
Sea. and Routes and Traffic Separation Scheme need to be observed along
routes "ordinarily used for international navigation" in the Baltic Sea.
in the Sea of Okhotsk. and in the Sea of Japan (art. 12).
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However. prior authorization for foreign warships is required to
travel in Soviet internal waters. 30 days in advance. except when "heads
of state or governments" are on board. in which case a seven day prior
notification is required. or when it is a "forced entrance" which is
deemed to be due to emergencies (art. 16).
Not only did the USSR revise its 1983 Rules of Navigation for
Warships. but it introduced legislation to establish an exclusive
maritime zone of 200 nautical miles, within which area special
environmental measures will be enforced. The Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet Decree Establishing a 200 n. mile zone was enacted on February
29. 1984. and its implementation will entail the enforcement of various
measures:
The USSR in its EEZ proclamation indicates that in
connection with specific regions of its EEZ. for
technical, resource use, and environmental reasons,
special obligatory measures will be taken to prevent
pollution from vessels. Such measures will include
those relating to unspecified navigation practices and
will be eS7~blished by the Soviet Council of
Hinisters.
Moreover. the Soviet Union has taken action to solidify its claims
that the waters of the NSSR are internal by establishing straight
baselines; these measures will be discussed separately at the end of this
chapter.
The Sector Theory Principle
The Soviet Union first espoused the sector principle in 1926, with
the Decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the USSR by virtue
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of which the Soviet Union claims sovereignty over all lands and islands
within the Soviet Arctic sector:
All lands and islands both discovered and which may be
discovered in the future. which do not comprise at the
time of publication of the present decree the
territory of any foreign state recognized by the
Government of the USSR. located in the Northern Arctic
Ocean. north of the shores of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics up to the North Pole between the
meridian 32 0 04 35" E. long. from Greenwich. running
along the eastern side of Vaida Bay through the
triangular marker on Cape Kekurskii. and the meridian
1680 49' 30" W. long. from Greenwich. bisecting the
strait separating the Ratmanov and Kruzenstern Islands
of the Diomede group in the ~5ring Sea. are proclaimed
to be territory of the USSR.
This Soviet claim excludes lands claimed by recognized foreign states. and
refers notably to the Svalbard Islands. which is a Norwegian
territory.76 Further. it should be noted that the 1926 Decree does not
state clearly that the claim is based on the sector theory. while it would
appear that. in fact. it is. The meaning of "territory" is not defined.
although subsequent interpretations by Soviet jurists have been rather
liberal. The interpretation given is that "territory" includes all
maritime areas. water and ice. within the delimited sector:
Must the rights of the USSR be viewed and limited only
to the few islands. and that the rest of the Arctic
with its floating and fast ice-fields. inland lakes.
straits ••• [be] left by the Soviet government for
unlimited exploitation by any of the capitalist
plunderers ••• ? Obviously not. for such a conclusion
would be in conflict with the whole idea of the Decree
••• [which] must be understood to include •.• also ice
formations and the seas surrounding them. for
otherwise the polar sector adjacent to the USSR would
have to be considered as an open sea with all the 77
consequences resulting from such an interpretation.
Further. Soviet legal experts. notably Lakhtin in 1928. have put forth
the notion that the sector theory is a widely accepted principle
,-,
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requiring an "international conference to negotiate the final
d i d I hI' d' . ,,78 f h Icoor ~nates an se ect t e u t~mate es~gnat~on or eac po ar
sector.
Notwithstanding the various interpretations of the sector theory by
Soviet jurists. the Soviet Government has opted to refrain from making
any firm commitment as to its official position regarding whether or not
the USSR endorses the all-encompassing claims that the applied Soviet
"sector theory" in the Arctic would include:
Why then do the Soviets continue to emphasize their
1926 sector claim? No one is disputing their
sovereignty over all the lands and the islands in
their sector. and there are no unknown islands
remaining to be discovered within it. The reason
behind the Soviet policy is probably a desire to keep
alive the concept of a 'Soviet sector.' By stressing
the concept of a sector exclusively containing Soviet
lands and islands. the Soviets are keeping the option
of going a step further and declaring that the Arctic
waters 7~ntaining Soviet lands and islands are Soviet
waters.
The "keep-the-options-open" approach is thus central to the official
Soviet decision to remain silent on the sector theory principle insofar
as Arctic region is concerned. Inherent in the sector theory is that
all lands. islands. and waters lying within such a sector are under the
total and sole jurisdiction of the sovereign state; the effect is to
render any waters and waterways within the sector part and parcel of a
state's internal waters.
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Territorial Waters
The Soviet Union has e stablished a 12 n , mile territorial sea prior
to its ratification of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and
C · Z 80ont~guous one. The Statute on the Protection of the State Border
of the USSR,81 enacted in August 1960, refers to the territorial sea as
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"coastal sea waters." It has had the ultimate result of closing off
the Vil'kitskii Strait and the Karskiye Vorota Strait, which measure
respectively 22 1/2 miles and 11 miles in width. 83 and which are
essential waterways for vessels using the NNSR:
The Soviet Union has been able to control the Northern
Sea Route (Northeast Passage) by claiming a 12-mile
territorial sea ... The 12-mile territorial sea boundary
and the difficulty of negotiating ice passage without
Soviet support in the Barents Sea/Svalba8~ Archipelago
have effectively nationalized the route.
Further. the 1960 Soviet Statute required prior authorization for
foreign warships to transit in its territorial waters and for research
vessels to carry out scientific activities. Internal Soviet legislation
d d di 1 85was amen e accor ~ng y To make use of any waterways within the
territorial waters of the USSR. a foreign state had to therefore make a
request for permission to do so. and not merely give a simple notice of
intentions. 86 At least with respect to military vessels it was
therefore quite clear that the Soviet interpretation. though its
domestic legislation relating to its territorial waters, and the
implications thereof. are similar or akin to that of "internal waters."
over which a state has sovereign rights and in which there is no right
of innocent passage:
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Although the Soviet s claim to adhere to Article 16.4
of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone. which grants the right of innocent
passage through 'international straits. they have
apparently taken the position that the straits along
the Soviet Arctic coastS}ne cannot be construed as
international straits.'
Internal Waters and Closed Seas
According to international law. the internal waters of a coastal
state are under the complete control and jurisdiction of the state. and
88
no "innocent passage" is allowed through those waters. In the case
of the USSR. it is most interesting to observe what the state considers
as internal waters: Soviet waters of ports. "of bays. inlets. coves and
estuaries." landward of straight baselines are internal waters. as well
as those "waters of bays. inlets. coves. and estuaries. seas and straits
historically belonging to the USSR.,,89 The Soviet Union thus claims as
"internal" the waters of those gulfs. inlets and bays whose seaward
breadth are less than 24 n. mile according to conventional law. and also
many other water areas of gulfs. straits and seas on "historical" basis:
In the Arctic. the Soviet Union has designated
numerous coastal water areas as its 'internal watgOs.'
based on both geographic and historical criteria.
Another feature of Soviet international legal rationale is that the
Soviet Union has claimed the Kara. Laptev and East Siberian Seas as
land-locked seas. on the basis of "mare clausam" or closed seas:
A 'closed sea' regime. by definition. provides for the
unrestricted passage of all vessels of the coastal
states. but excludes any transit of warships of any
non-coastal state .•.• and any sea. regardless of
expanse. may be rendered closed by the concurrence of
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all the coastal states which border the sea •.• The
Soviets define closed seas as 'seas which essentially
constitute routes leading to the ports and shores of
coastal states and are connec9rd to the high seas
through a series of straits.'
The development of the closed sea doctrine by the USSR has been
perceived by observers as a deliberate effort to consolidate Soviet
strategic interests in the Arctic:
The closed sea doctrine ..• is an attempt to establish a
legal precedent for excluding"9~aval powers from the
approaches to Soviet territory.
However, scientific expeditions by the US in the early 1960's in those
seas would make it diff icult for the USSR "to discharge the burden of
proving that some of the Siberian Seas constitute historic wa t e rs , ,,93
Historic Waters
The last three decades have witnessed greater Soviet development of
the historic approach to claims. It would appear that the historical
basis would supersede any attempt to sustain claims on the basis of the
sector theory. which. as has been mentioned. has not been relinquished
or abandoned by Soviet authorities. Indeed. international legal experts
seem to view the Soviet reliance on historical factors to establish
claims as just another aspect of a global Soviet Arctic claim. the
motivation of which lies in a variety of interests and considerations:
The 'historic waters' approach to the legal status of
the polar seas, as developed in Soviet doctrine. is an
amalgam of arguments resting upon historical
discovery, physical characteristics of the seas.
econ?mic d:velo§~ent of the region. and strategic
co n s i.dera t aon s ,
35
Mor eove r , In Li ght of the Int ernational Court of Justice r u Ld.ng
that the Indrelia sea route wa s part of Norway's internal waters on the
basis of history and geography. Soviet legal experts have used the 1951
Fisheries Case as support for their historic seas claims. and more
pa~ticularly. in reference to the Northeast passage:
The Northern Sea Route passin~ through the purely
Arctic Seas of the Soviet polar sector is our historic
national sea route. created by the stubborn labor of
the Ru~sia~5people over a period of several
cen tu r r e s ,
and "the Northern Sea Route is a Russian national route. in many ways
96identical to Norway's Indrelia route."
While some Western specialists contend that the USSR would have
much difficulty in sustaining historical proof due to US scientific
mis sions in those Soviet seas. 97 Soviet legal authorities maintain that
the "Arctic seas along which t.he Northern Sea Route passes and the
straits located within the seas have never been used without the
k 1 d d .. f . l' . ,,98 d hnow e ge an prOV1Slon 0 specla Sovlet servlces. an tat.
therefore. these are historic waters.
Straight Baselines Regime
The international legal basis for establishing a straight baseline
system have been dealt with in the previous chapter under an identical
sub-heading.
In what appears to have been a two-fold operation. the USSR has
proceeded, in the very recent years, to define the basepoints for the
drawing of straight baselines around its extensive coastline. Phase One
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was initiated on February 7, 1984 "lith the adoption by the USSR Counc il
of r·lini sters of a decree which identified the list of geographic
coordinates of points so as to enable the establishment of a straight
baseline regime.
The Decree declares that from the listed basepoints will be
measured "the breadth of the t erritorial sea, exclusive economic zone
and the continental shelf of the USSR off the continental coast and
i slands of the Pacific Ocean, the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhosk and
h B . S ,,99t e erlng ea.
Less than a year later, phase II became operational.
On January IS, 1985, the Soviet Union by virtue of a Decree of the
USSR Council of Ministers approved a twenty-five page document listing
the geographic coordinates of basepoints which established a straight
baseline system along the coastline of the Soviet Union, including the
Soviet Arctic Region. The USSR declaration is straightforward and
determines the
geographic coordinates of points from which the
breadth of the territorial sea, exclusive economic
zone and the continental shelf of the USSR off the
continental coast and the islar55 of the Arctic Ocean
and the Baltic and Black Seas.
Not only were the basepoints identified, but the Decree declared
that the waters of White Sea. the Cheshskaya Bay and the Baydaratskaya
Bay were internal waters, "as historically belonging to the USSR." This
historical element is not invoked in the 1984 declaration.
The effect of such action encloses all sea routes and waters
landward of those baselines as internal waters of the Soviet Union, and
the sovereign state has absolute control over these waters. Obviously
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a n this case. the National Northern Sea Route is completely being
subjected to the internal waters regime. and, consequently all rights of
innocent passage that would normally exist may in the present
circumstances be very limited if not nil. The NEP has now been not only
under the total jurisdiction but in practice. it has been the USSR's
state prerogative to allow and guide vessels interested in navigating a n
those 'daters.
Conclusion
The descriptive survey of the Northeast passage. the review of the
Soviet legislative measures as well as a closer scrutiny of the various
concepts and notions relating to the status of" ihe waters bordering the
Soviet state, have constituted an att'empt to determine the basis of the
Soviet position with respect to its National Northern Sea Route.
In the last two years. the USSR has enacted a 200 nautical mile
Maritime Economic Zone and established straight baselines along its
coastline. It is through a series of legal doctrines and legislative
enactments that emerges the Soviet stand: all waters bordering the
Soviet state. be they bays. seas or straits are internal waters of the
USSR. the Northeast Passage included. on the basis of history and of a
series of Soviet precepts as found in legislation and in interpretations
of Soviet international legal experts.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE CANADIAN AND SOVIET POSITIONS: AN ANALYSIS
Not only are there similarities between the claims put forth by
Canada and the Soviet Union related to their respective northern
waterways. but there is a striking resemblance in the international
legal basis upon which are founded the posit ions of both states. There
are also differences.
This chapter will compare and contrast the Canadian and Soviet
positions. and examine these claims in light of the 1982 Convention on
the Law of the Sea. But first. the review of considerations of a
general nature is imperative.
General Considerations
Canada and the Soviet Union are both Arctic rim states; they have
the largest coastal frontage on the Arctic Ocean. and their coastline is
endowed with a northern sea route linking both the Atlantic and Pacific
Ocean. Both claim the internal waters status for the waterways along
their respective coasts. These are some commonalities between both
states.
The major differences are of a different order. The USSR is a
maritime state while Canada has the status of a coastal state1 0 1 The
Soviet Union's military capabilities can only be matched by those of the
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United States which is also an Arctic rim state. Further. the USSR
enjoys the status of a superpower within the international community of
nations along with the US.
For its part. Canada has often been referred to as a middle-power;
this nomenclature usually designates an industrialized state whose
military strength is relatively average and whose economy is that of a
developed state. However. the middle-power status can enable a state to
be effective on the nation states' checkerboard of international
politics.
Like other sovereign states. Canada and the Soviet Union have their
own views to defend. positions to assert. agenda to follow and interests
to protect. Both have ratified the 1958 Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone and are signatory to the 1982 Convention on
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the Law of the Sea. The new Law of the Sea established "a new
umbrella empowering a great number of traditional and new entities to
take legal measures .i n a complex new maritime world" 103 The new
law-making treaty is a mammoth1 04 document which spells out the rights
and duties of the sovereign states in the conduct of their ocean related
activities.
The interests of a maritime and coastal state may well vary; each
will need to follow the appropriate course of action that will yield the
best results. and that is usually dictated by the political and military
power a state holds. It is therefore pertinent to examine in a first
instance the respective approaches that the Soviet Union and Canada
adopted during the UNCLOS deliberations. especially with reference to
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the navigati onal i ssues of the Convention and the Arctic environmental
concerns that we re addressed.
The Soviet Approach Dudn8 UHCLOS III
It h as been observed that the USSR position during the UNCLOS III
deliberations differed considerably from the Soviet posture during the
UNCLOS I discussi ons. This can be attributed to the USSR's emergence as
a major c ivilian and military maritime power. result ing from the
deliberate and massive build-up of its naval capabilities during the
1051960's and early 1970's.
In many areas of marit ime interests during the UNCLOS III
discussions. the USSR was cornered between ideological and pragmatic
concerns: as a maritime power. the USSR was to argue for freedom of
navigation along with the US. The Soviet and American interests in
global mobility for their naval forces were quite identical: "concern
over transit through international straits was a key impetus to
Soviet-Ame r i c a n coordination in convening UNCLO SIll. ,,106
Having maritime interests to sail the seas through the various
strategic choke-points around the globe. the USSR supported and actively
sought provisions for transit passage in international straits just like
the United States would do:
Strategists of both the United States and the USSR
recognized that the cooperation of the other side was
necessary to secure key provisions at the conference.
Each side had a clear interest in establishing rules
that would allow competition on the seas without the
kind of restrictions that might unduly tempt the use
of force - for example to107ize a closed strait or
other strategic watenlay.
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The joint US-USSR efforts entailed a favourable overall outcome on the
international straits issue; the interests of maritime powers were
protected and enshrined in conventional law.
However. when it came to the security implications of an open
regime for the northern Arctic waters. the Soviets behaved differently:
The Soviet Union behaved like a maritime power at
UNCLOS III .•• except regarding the north. There they
behaved like a coastal state ••• The Soviets in any case
maintained that there are no 'international straits'
in the waters of the USSR. Thus the transit passage
called for in the Draft Convention. with its allowance
for overflight and submerged navigation by submafbges.
would not be applicable to Soviet coastal areas.
It is quite evident that the USSR was not ready nor willing to open
its northern sea route to international navigation; the implications are
that the Soviet Union while enhancing its maritime mobility around the
globe was not prepared to give unconditional access to its shores to
other maritime powers. notably to its greatest competitor. the United
States.
Further. it is interesting to note that the USSR supported a
coastal state. Canada. insofar as the ice-covered provision is
concerned; this provision has often been referred to as the "Canada
clause".
Basically. the Soviets managed to maintain their global mobility on
the world's oceans by securing the transit passage provisions for
international straits. to protect their security interests in waterways
close to their homeland. to close off their northern coastal area to
. .. 1 fl 109 d . f he i A· ..fore~gn nav~gat~ona eet an to re~n orce t e~r rct~c pos~t~on
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with their support for the inclusion of the ice-covered areas
.. 110provls10ns.
The Canadian Approach during UNCLOS III
The desire for increased jurisdiction in fisheries and in other
areas of the oceans was the motivation to participate in UNCLOS III
proceedings for most coastal states. Canada included. The pursuit of
such objective prescribed Canada's behavior which was "in line with the
international movement of coastal states to secure expansion of national
. . d" " ,,111JurlS lctlon.
In its position as a middle-power and interested participant.
Canada pursued its objectives through the diplomatic channels; this
Canadian approach was summarized very candidly by a member of the
Canadian delegation:
We are not naive idealists. but we believe in
international law and recognize that we cannot pick
and choose the laws that suit us ••• neither are we
among the superpowers. We cannot impose our will on
others by force. even if we believe it was proper to
do so. Nor are we among the countries of the world
that can pretend to play David against Goliath. hoping
that sympathy for the little guy can wt~20ur battles
for us. So we proceeded to negotiate.
The avenue of compromise and diplomacy did in fact bring positive
results with respect to Canada's fisheries interests. But the
protection and management of the fisheries in an exclusive
jurisdictional zone was not Canada's only preoccupation.
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Canada shared the difficulties and concerns of some developing
states in coping during the sixties. with the pollution problems of
developed flag states.
Pollution from vessels issue was discussed in UNCLOS III. and
preventive and remedial measures to prevent any pollution from this
source were proposed. Although the traditional enforcement role of the
flag states l 13 is confirmed in the 1982 Convention. there is also
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recognition and clarification of the state's enforcement role.
Of equal importance for Canada. was the acceptance of the coastal
state's legislative authority. in special circumstances. to take
mandatory measures preventing pollution from vessels. within the limits
of its jurisdiction and in accordance with the international rules and
d d f h .. 1 .. 115stan ar sot e competent 1nternat10na organ1zat10n.
But of greater significance was the inclusion in the 1982
Convention of the provision for a coastal state to secure special
environmental authority in "ice-covered areas"; this provision has been
dubbed the Canadian clause:
Coastal states have the right to adopt and enforce
non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the
prevention. reduction and control of marine pollution
from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of
the exclusive economic zone. where particularly severe
climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering
such areas for most of the year create obstructions or
exceptional hazards to navigation. and pollution of
the marine environment could cause major harm to or
irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance.
Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to
navigation and the protection and preservation of the
ma:ine enYtgonment based on the best scientific
eV1dence.
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The inclusion of this provision also supported by the USSR in the
new law of the sea secured Canada's special environmental authority in
"ice covered areas" and in essence gave international validation to its
1970 AWPP legislation which had received much criticism from the
US. I 17 Other Canadian interests were met and will be discussed in the
next section.
Having established that. for both Canada and the Soviet Union.
their approach during UNCLOS III consisted of seeking international
support for the inclusion of conventional legal provisions that would
meet their interests and concerns. it is important to consider both
Canadian and Soviet claims in light of the 1982 Convention.
Comparative Analysis of the Canadian and Soviet Claims.
and the 1982 Convention
In assessing similarities and differences between the international
legal basis of their claims of internal waters status for their
respective northern sea routes. it is enlightening to examine
concomitantly what can be of avail within the provisions of the 1982
Convention to sustain the position of both states. as well as in
customary international law.
Arctic Sector Theory
The Soviet Union is said by Soviet experts to have committed itself
to the sector theory with the enactment of the 1926 Decree. However.
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the Soviet Government has never expressly declared its espousal of this
theory; rather. it is adopting a silent rule of conduct on the matter.
This has been interpreted as a willingness to maintain the theory alive
and to keep its options open. The issuance of an official disclaimer of
the theory by Soviet authorities would hinder their resorting to it
should need be. One of the reasons could well be that the USSR is
relying on the 1926 Decree. which established the sector lines. to
support its position in discussions with Norway to settle their shelf
delimitation in the Barents Sea.
Canadians have been attributed with the development of the sector
theory insofar as the Arctic is concerned. No recent government
officials nor politicians have alluded to it as a basis for sustaining
Canada's claims with respect to the NWP. Since 1904. the sector line
appears on official Canadian maps. There has been no formal denial to
the effect that the Government of Canada considers the sector principle
as a valid basis for its claims. Insofar as Canada is concerned. it
would appear that the theory has been put on the back burner. or that it
is dormant. to say the least. It could well be that the reasoning for
Canada's silence is somewhat akin to what has been suggested for the
Soviet Union: the sector theory will not necessarily be advocated. but
would be. should it become necessary.
The sector theory as incorporated in the 1926 Soviet Decree and as
alluded to by Soviet experts and Canadian officials has never received
international recognition. "The general opinion of publicists and
commentators is that the sector theory has no legal validity as a source
of title in international law. and cannot serve as a legal basis for the
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acquisition of sovereignty over land. and a fortiori. over sea
118
areas". Canada has never mentioned it during the UNCLOS III
discussions. and furthermore the 1982 Convention does not make any
mention of it. so that it does not appear to have been either retained
or internationally recognized as a valid basis for claims.
Historical Basis
In studying the development of Soviet international legal thinking
in matters of maritime jurisdiction. the reliance on historicity gains
prominence over either the sector theory or the closed sea doctrine.
The combination of historical discovery. economic development. and
strategic concerns along with physical considerations of the bodies of
water in question constitute the foundation of Soviet Arctic claims on
historical basis. In response to the US protest related to the Soviet's
claim of internal water for Peter the Great Bay. the USSR Government
explained that those waters are "historically waters of the Soviet Union
by force of geographic conditions of that bay and its special economic
d d f "f' ,,119an e ense s1gn1 1cance.
The very notion of history implies a chronology of events in an
evolutionary process over time; such a sequence of events could well
include discovery. occupation. economic activity and others relevant to
the essence of statehood. Soviet international experts have molded the
historical basis notion from the wording of domestic legislation. so
that claims can be sustained on the basis of history together with other
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considerations of vital interests. And the National Northern Sea Route
is of that historical category.
In the Canadian perspective. historical basis can be invoked to
sustain the internal waters status of the NWP. Both government
officials and politicians have claimed exclusive jurisdiction over the
NWP on historical grounds and as recently as 1985. Although the
government has not specified exactly what the implications are. experts
are of the opinion that to substantiate such a claim. Canada would need
to prove "exclusive control over those waters for a long period of
time". to show that "this control has been acquiesced in by foreign
states. particularly those affected by the claim.,,120
Succinctly. both Canada and the USSR are claiming exclusive
jurisdiction over the Northwest and Northeast Passages on the basis of
history.
The international legal regime does provide two avenues for
historical claims: customary law allows for the argumentation of claim
founded on historical basis as in the case of historical bays. and
conventional law provides for the drawing of straight baselines which
has the effect of making internal all the waters enclosed within the
perimeter. thus created by such baselines. This begs a first question:
Can Canada and the Soviet Union claim the waters of their northern sea
routes as internal on the basis of history?
In considering the Arctic region. the only clear historic claim
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made has been that of the Peter the Great Bay by the Soviet Union.
Also. the 1951 Fisheries case. between Norway and the United Kingdom.
dealt with historical arguments to claim the Indrelia sea route as
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· I 122 b I- 0 d I 0 Ir n t e rna waters; ut n i.s t ory was secon ary to geo ogy a n t ie
argumentation put forth. To claim its sk j a e rga a rd , Norway invoked
history but stressed its straight baseline application to support its
CB[1e that the fjords along its coastline were within lJorwegian internal
waters. As a result of the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Case, the straight
baseline system was incorporated in the 1958 Convention on Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone1 23 and reconfirmed in the new Law of the
S C . 124ea onventl0n.
Further, both the 1958 Convention and the 1982 Convention, adopted
h 24 '1 125 1 • 1 0 f b La i dOlt e ml e c_oslng lne or ays c alme as lnterna waters.
Although the possibility of having historic waters has been referred to
, I- 1982 C . h . h b 1 i f i d1 26 d 1ln tHe onventlon, t e questlon as not een carl le an on y
customary law offers any guidance. For example, the requirements to
claim a historic bay are quite strict and straight-forward. By
extrapolation, in claiming the historic waters status for these
waterways, Canada and the Soviet Union would need to demonstrate their
effective control over those waters for a long period of time, and most
importantly, the acquiescence by other states of such a historic title
to those Arctic waters. Even if the exercise by Canada of jurisdiction
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and control could be convincingly presented, and that of the USSR is
established, the US objection or protest to these waters having internal
waters status would prevent compliance with the exigency of acquiescence
by other interested states. Bence, in establishing historic title, so
that the waters of the NWP and NEP are deemed to be internal, the
customary law avenue relating to the "extension" of the historic bay
requirements would appear to be of no avail.
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It is undoubtedly due to the difficulty of arriving at a definition
of terms. probably more importantly at reaching consensus. that the new
law of the sea is silent on the historical basis for establishing title
to waters. other than those of bays.
But if the NEP and N~7P were considered 'international' waters. the
implications would be enormously different. At this time. it is
important to address whether or not the NWP end NEP can be deemed
'international' waterways in light of the international legal framework.
The International Waters Status
The mere discussion of international straits at the UNCLOS III
preparatory sessions produced some of the most animated debates: the
maritime powers were insisting on maximum unrestricted freedom of
navigation for understandable commercial and strategic imperatives.
while the coastal states were preoccupied with increased restrictions
for marine environmental protection and national security purposes. 1 28
The various and often conflicting positions of states crippled the
1982 Convention in any effort to define or in any attempt to clarify the
international navigable strait:
UNCLOS (III) has not altered or clarified the existing
uncertainty in customary law over the definif~~n of
'straits used for international navigation'.
Since there is evidently a lack of consensus as to the exact
definition of an international strait. it is nonetheless important to
highlight the basic characteristics of such international waterways.
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namely the geographic and functional element s of international straits.
and more precisely. to investigate how these elements apply to the NvlP.
Two general observations are first required: the straits having
within their borders a strip of high seas or EEZ present no problem
since the traditional fr e edom of the high s eas governs; hoveve r ,
problems do arise when the territorial seas of one or more bordering
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states overlap and eliminate the traditional high seas passage.
Insofar as the geographic elements are concerned, it is generally
conceded that "any na r r ov and natural passage between adjacent land
masses. joining two parts of the high seas or two bodies of water.,,131
comes within the definition of a strait. The 1982 Convention refers to
"straits used for international navigation between one part of the high
seas or an exclusive econanic zone and another part of the high seas or
I . . ,,132an exc USlve economlc zone.
In light of the above. it would therefore be essential. insofar as
the NWP is involved. to establish whether or not it joins two parts of
the high seas and whether or not Canada's territorial sea overlaps.
As mentioned earlier. the NWP has several routes. the most
important ones being Route 1 and 2, which are the most suitable for
deep-draft navigation. And if the test were applied, it could be argued
that the ~MP is an international legal strait since existing
technological engineering has produced icebreakers that can easily
travel through its frozen waters and ice terrain. from the Atlantic (via
Labrador Sea. Davis Strait and Baffin Bay) to the Pacific Ocean (via
k ch i dB' . ) 133. h dBeaufort Sea. Chuc Chl Sea an the erlng Stralt; ln ot er wor s.
from a high seas or EEZ area to another.
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The ultimate result was to
The extension of Canada's territorial sea from three nautical miles
to twelve nautical miles in 1970. had the effect of overlapping the
State's territorial sea and bringing under Canada's total control the
. . and out of the t rr.• p.134maJor gateways lnto .w
include the waters of the NWP under the exclusive jurisdiction of
Canada. It is how it was perceived. and intended.
Thus. from the geographic perspective. the NWP can be said to be an
international legal strait. 1 35 although all legal experts may not share
h ··1 1· 136t e Slml ar cone USlon. There is however. less certainty in
relation to the functional element or characteristic pertaining to
international straits.
In examining the functional aspect of a sea route to determine
international strait status. the principle emulating from the Corfu
Channel Case is applied: the international strait must have had an
appreciable history as a "useful route for international maritime
traffic.,,137 The facts upon which that principle was formulated are
supportive: 2884 crossings by ships of seven states over a period of 21
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months.
In contrast. the NWP has had up to 1984 and over the last eighty
years. forty crossings of which twenty seven (or near 70%) were by
Canadian vessels while ten (or 25%) of those were by American ships with
Canadian officials aboard. 1 39 In light of those statistics. the most
that can be said is that any attempt to classify the NWP as an
international strait on the basis of its functional aspects could not be
. d 140
s ust aarie •
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Howeve r , in
If the actual use of the NWP is not conclusive. what about the
potential use in the years to come?
The American courts give weight to the potential usefulness of sea
routes in assessing their navigability; it is the test of the "capacity
f .. h i h' h ff' .. "141or nav~gat~on w ~c ~s tee ect~ve cr~ter~on.
international law. as ~n the Corfu Channel Case. it is
actual use.
the test of
To this date. there has not been. any voyages through the NWP.
which can be termed as of a "commercial" navigation nature. The SS
Manhattan was a commercial vessel of an oil company. but it was carrying
water on its trial run through the Passage. On the basis of having a
good record as an advantageous international maritime trade route. it
would be difficult to maintain that the NWP is an international legal
strait. notwithstanding the fact that international shipping is foreseen
to augment in the NWP as the hydrocarbon developments occur and progress
on both the American and the Canadian areas of the Beaufort Sea. 14 2
Then. the NWP could be termed as a frequently used international
maritime waterway. conferring upon it the international strait status:
"[if] industrial proposals to use the passage are sanctioned by the
Canadian government. oil and gas traffic could become a reality by
1990."143
Insofar as the Northeast Passage is concerned. "all of the straits
connecting two polar seas of the Northeast Passage or within a polar sea
of the Northeast Passage could be characterized as 'used for
international navigation",:144 they join parts of high seas to
another. But the Soviet Union through its 1960 Statute establishing a
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twelve mile territorial sea has closed off the gat~lays to the Northeast
Passage: the Vil'kitskii Strait and the Karskiye Vorota Strait which
are essential watel~ays for any foreign ships atternptin8 to traverse the
NNSR. 14 5
In terIDS of usage. the Northeast Passage is a very busy wate~ay.
The Soviet Union exercises effective control over it since it has
rendered compulsory icebreaker and pilotage services. in most straits of
146
the Passage. and in 1967, when the Soviet Union invited certain
foreign shippers to use the Northeast Passage, it distributed a brochure
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setting out the rates." The implication is that any foreign vessel
is capable of using the passage as long as it pays user fees for
services and abides to rules and regulations of the NEP Authority.
"Coastal trading and cabotage is a monopoly of the Soviet State
along the Northern Sea Route, and it is unlikely that foreign shipping
would be admitted to any sizeable extent in this trade. But the
development of the Northern Sea Route has created the infrastructure, as
measured by navigation facilities, ice-breaking and pilotage services,
weather reconnaissance, basic knowledge of the region, ports. and a
potential demand for expanded interchange with other areas of the world,
148for navigation on quite another scale." In other words, the
Northeast Passage could easily pass the functional test as to the number
of ships including foreign flag vessels that are traveling through its
waters, since it is open for business. The problem still remains that
the NNSR is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state, which
considers its waters as internal.
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Further. submarines could
Should the NWP and the NEP thus become international navigation
routes. all ships and aircrafts would enjoy under the 1982 Convention
h . d d . h f . 149 f h ft e unlmpe e rlg t 0 translt passage or t e purpose 0
" d i d' . ,,150expe ltlOUS an contlnuous translt.
proceed in their normal mode of navigation. that is travelling submerged
under the Passage. It is consequently to the advantage of maritime
powers. for both commercial and strategic purposes to have as many
straits as possible considered international waterways. It is for such
reasons that the US maintains that the NWP and NEP waters are
in terna tional.
In terms of both the NWP and the NEP. they could hardly be
classified as international sea routes since they do not meet the
functional criterion. but in different respects: the NWP could not be
termed a waterway 'used for international navigation' for there is
little movement; and the NEP Authority requires assistance for
ice-breaker and pilotage services for vessels going through the Key
straits. The various legislative measures of the USSR combined with
Soviet legal doctrines and interpretations are invoked to maintain those
NEP waters as internal.
Legislative Measures
Through a series of enactments. the Soviet Union has asserted
exclusive jurisdiction of the NNSR and maintained that its waters are
internal. The intent of these measures was constant. and their effect
was to counter any attempt to internationalize the passage: 1) the
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espousal of the sector theory; 2) the e s t ab Li shment of a 12 n , mi l.e
territorial sea, closing off essential straits; 3) the implementation of
a management framework requiring compulsory ice-breaker and pilotage
services, and regulating movement of vessels; 4) the establishment. of an
EEZ; 5) the issl~nce of rules governing passage of warships; and, 6)
finally, the d r av i.ng of straight baselines along its coastline. I SI
With these legislative measures in place, no foreign vessel could ven-
ture into the NEP waters without the concurrence of the Soviet Govern-
ment.
For its part, the Canadian government proceeded somewhat similarly
with respect to its attempt to consolidate the internal waters status of
the NWP and to regulate any intrusion of foreign vessels in its waters:
1) pollution safety and construction and design standards were made
mandatory for ships sailing through the NWP, and a 100 n. mile pollution
protection zone was established; 2) the territorial sea was extended
from 3 to 12 nautical mile to control the gateways to the Passage; 3)
the 200 n. miles EFZ was established to assert greater jurisdiction over
the fisheries resource; 4) the decision to adopt immediately measures to
apply Canadian civil and criminal law in offshore areas including the
Arctic; 5) the establishment of straight baselines around the Canadian
A . A h' 1 152rctlc rc lpe ago.
The motivation of both states in introducing these legislative
measures was to secure the exclusive sovereignty of the state over the
water and ice of their waterways. In the Soviet perspective, strategic
concerns may have been of primary interest; for Canada, a combination of
national sovereignty preoccupations and environmental concerns for the
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fragile ecosystems of the Arctic undoubtedly prompted the enactment of
these legislative concerns.
It is interesting to note that the Northern Sea Route Authority was
given increased powers pursuant to the US attempt to sail through the
Northeast Passage. Similarly, the 1970 AWPP Act and the extension of
Canada's territorial sea from 3 to 12 n. miles were directly related to
the Manhattan challenge of 1969-70, and the establishment of straight
baselines in 1985, to the Polar Sea traversing the Northwest Passage.
In light of the 1982 Convention, it should be pointed out that the
ice-covered areas provision does recognize both Canada and USSR's
"uniqueness" of their Arctic domain, and allows for the enactment of
special legislation to protect the fragile environment of those Arctic
areas that lie within their EEZ's. It represents, for Canada,
international acknowledgment of the validity of its 1970 legislation.
which. besides attracting US attention and protest. had created a 100 n.
mile pollution prevention zone.
Further. both the USSR and Canada's twelve n. mile territorial sea
become acceptable internationally under the new law of the sea.
Straight Baselines Regime
The 1982 Convention has restated the provisions of the 1958
Convention which had codified the judgment of the 1951 Fisheries Case
elaborating the criteria for the establishment of straight baselines.
Canada has drawn straight baselines around its Arctic Archipelago
as provided for in the 1982 Convention. A discussion of this issue was
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presented at the end of Chapter 2. Canada can justify these baselines
on the basis of the "very special geographic and physical
characteristics of the archipelago", and on "the year-round and
immemorial use of some of those waters to consolidate its title".153
It would thus appear that a combination of the uniqueness of the Arctic
area, with the historical fact proving occupation since time immemorial
by the Inuit population could justify Canada's actions to draw straight
baselines.
The Soviet Union has established straight baselines around its
coast in the two decrees of February 1984 and January 1985.
A question that is raised relates to the 1982 provision which
states that when waters enclosed by baselines were not previously
considered internal waters, "a right of innocent passage shall
exist.,,154 Neither Canada nor the USSR however considered the waters
landward of those baselines as international waters; therefore, no right
of innocent passage would need to exist. However, the US would not
agree, for Washington maintains that these enclosed waters of the
passages are international.
Conclusions
The Soviet Union and Canada are basically founding their respective
claims to the NEP and NWP on the same principal basis: history and
geography. They have implemented legislative measures to reinforce
their positions and to ascertain to the international community that
these northern passages are within their exclusive jurisdiction.
Although the Arctic Sector theory is not internationally recognized to
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sustain their claims, both states have not officially stated their
rejection or abandonment; their reluctance to relinquish the sector
theory may stem from the desire to avail themselves of that principle
should the need be.
Canada drew its Arctic baselines six months after the Soviet Union
took similar action the USSR action was unilateral, so was Canada's in
spite of the fact that the Canadian measure was in reaction to the US
insistence that the NWP waters are international.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE US POSITION AND RAMIFICATIONS
Around the world there are numerous straits which, on the basis of
their international status, are to the avail of all states for maritime
navigation even though they may fall within the territorial waters of
one or more states. Some of these include the Strait of Gibraltar from
the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, the Strait of Malacca from the Bay of
Bengal to the South China Sea between Malaysia and Indonesia, and the
Strait of Hormuz between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Such
waterways do meet the two essential characteristics of an international
strait: they link areas of the high seas or exclusive economic zones
and have traditionally been regular and valuable commercial routes.
As underlined above, the NWP lacks the attribute of being a
traditional commercial waterway. But also in the Arctic region, as it
has been discussed, there exists another northern waterway, notably the
Northeast Passage (NEP) or the Northern Sea Route. It is in dealing
with these "international" waters that the US Arctic policy and practice
shows signs of inconsistency.
The US Policy
The most recent and clearest statement of the American position
towards either Soviet or Canadian claims in the Arctic is to be found in
the March 10, 1983 Presidential Proclamation,lSS where it is clearly
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expressed that the US will respect the rights of other states as
embodied in the 1982 Convention of the Law of the Sea. provided that the
traditional rights and freedoms of navigation and overflight of the US
are also respected.
Insofar as the Canadian and Soviet claims are concerned. the United
States.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
on historical claims.
"objects to any implication that Arctic waters have a
degree of historicity that mi fg6 make them the subject
of an internal water regime."
on territorial sea.
"will recognize [a 12 n , mile territorial sea] so long
as [such claims] take account of the international
rights of1gfher States. notably the right of innocent
passage. "
on environmental protection and security measures.
believes tha t "the navigational rights and freedoms
traditionally enjoyed by all states in and over the
oceans are applicable in the Arctic waters as they are
elsewhere around the globe. Arbitrary interference
with those rights and freedoms. whether in the name of
security or i~5§hat of environmental protection. cannot
be accepted."
on transit passage.
takes "the view that the transit passage regime applies
to all sf5~its used for international navigation in the
Arctic."
on the sector theory
does not agree witf66laims put forth on the basis of
the sector theory.
on the ice-covered theory
"takes the article [234. on ice-covered areas] as
little more than a recognition that some special
pollution rules may be called for in the Arctic.
consistent1~tth general navigational rights and
freedoms. "
on straight baselines.
believes in the strict or literal application of
Article 7 of the 1982 Convention on straight baselines.
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which car. be drawn when there iE a "fringe" of islands
aligned in the general direction of the coast; this
"precludes straight baselines from being drawn, for
instance, from one side of the Canadian mainland. up
and around the Canadian islands to the other side of
the Canadian mainland, having the effect of mf~~ng all
the water inside such lines internal waters."
The major concern of the US is to avoid acquiescine in the internal
waters status of states' waters that have been, or could with time
become. international waterways for either c ornmerc ieL or military
reasons. The recognition of the Arctic Passages as internal waters
would create precedents, in the US opinion. which could be followed by
other coastal states elsewhere in the world. That being said, it is
important to emphasize the fact that the "uniqueness" of the Arctic
Ocean has been formally and internationally recognized in the 1982
Convention. It is also difficult to imagine any other area of the globe
where the very nature and the particularities of the Arctic Basin could
be considered as identical.
Furthermore, it is apparent that by maintaining the traditional
ocean law regime as operative and by asserting at the same time that
Washington recognizes the general thrusts of the 1982 Convention to
which the US is not a signatory party, the United States is adopting a
"keep-the-options-open" approach. This attitude enables the US to
somehow pick and choose as to which claim Washington may want to
challenge the validity.
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The u.s. Practice
As mentioned beforehand. the American position is ~n simple terms,
that the Arctic passages are international waterways over which the
traditional freedoms of navigation and innocent passage apply. While
official Washington insists that the US is not challenging any Soviet or
Canadian claims. it does. however, assert that the US considers the NWP
and the NEP international sea routes.
In dealing with the functional aspect of a sea route to determine
its international strait status, it has been noted earlier that the
ruling of the Corfu Channel Case is of essence: the international
. h h d . d bl h i . I 163stra~t must ave a cons~ era e ~stor~ca usage. In the case of
Soviet Arctic waterways. ice conditions are such that to undertake the
NEP, a navigator will need to enter straits that are basically
164
choke-points between the Siberian seas.
There have been two attempts by the United States to pass through
the Vilkitskii Straits. A first one was "secretly" planned in the
summer of 1965; the Northwind icebreaker at that time was under constant
Soviet surveillance and when it came within 30 miles of the mouth of
Vilkitskii Strait, US authorities ordered the icebreaker to abandon the
attempt so as to avoid a showdown with the Soviet Union over the
165Northeast Arctic passage.
Two summers later, the US sent two powerful Coast Guard
icebreakers, the 269 foot Edisto and Eastwind, on an 8,000 mile
. .. f h A . 166c~rcumnav~gat~on 0 t e rct~c. Again, rather than challenging a
Soviet warning. the US government ordered the vessels to abandon their
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mi~:sion.167 This time. howev e r, the US State Department issued a
statement and an official protest was sent to MOSCO.l. The United States
maintained that:
the Soviet law cannot have the effect of c hang i.ng the
status of international waters and the rights of
foreign ships with respect to them. These rights are
set forth clearly in the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone of April 29. 1958. to which
the Soviet Union is a party. There is a right of
innocent passage for all ships through straits used for
international navigation between two parts of the high
seas. whether or not. as in the case of the Vi1kitsky
Straits. they are described by the Soviet Union as
being overlapped by territorial waters. and there is an
unlimited right of navigation on the high seas of
straits1g§mprising both high seas and territorial
waters.
In other words. the position of the United States is that the Northern
Sea Route is an international waterway over which the traditional
freedom of navigation and the right innocent passage apply.
In the Canadian Arctic. the US has challenged the internal waters
status of the NWP as claimed by Canada on two separate occasions: the
Manhattan Incident1 69 of 1969 and the Polar Sea Intrusion of 1985. 1 70
Both ventures into the ice-clogged route of the mlP were nothing more.
in Washington's view. than the innocent passage of 2 foreign vessel in
171
an international waterway. Canada expressed "deep regrets" over the
172US most recent challenge. and both Canada and the US agreed to
disagree. and mutually consented to the crossing without prejudicing
. h ,.. 173
elt er states posltl0n.
These agreeable arrangements resulted from intense diplomatic
maneuvering between officials of both governments. For the Canadian
Government. the whole episode was to say the least embarrassing.
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e s pe c i a Lly in light of the present Government's major thrusts in terms
of its foreign policy. which are aimed at establishing closer
cooperation and intensifying commercial and trade relations with the
. d 174Uni.t eStates.
Face-saving gestures had to be devised: an Order-in-Council
granted permission to the US to traverse the passage, and two Canadians
would be on board the Polar Sea ice-breaker as it will cross the
NWP. 174 The conflicting statements from Canadian and American
officials as to the role of the Canadians on board the Polar Sea could
b . d d d . " . 1 .. ,,17 6e lnterprete as a lng lnsu t to lnJury.
During those weeks of the evolving Polar Sea saga. it is suspected
- and could well be understandable - that many Canadians. equally those
in Government. would have wholeheartedly assented to the comments by the
Indonesian Ambassador. Mr. Djalal. on American relations with friendly
countries:
••• the United States seems to have the knack of
pressuring its friends. It seems to have the habit of
putting its friends into difficulties ••• In my mind the
United States is really trying to test our friendship
without offering a corresponding degree of friendship
and understanding of our problems. I think this
posture will raise difficulties in the long run
politically. Legally. we have our own opinion ••• maybe
the International Court of Justice will decide one
day. But politically. we will be placed in a difficult
position where our friendship is being tested. We do
not really mind as long as we also know that the United
States is showing some understanding of our
difft7~lties and our problems. But. that. we do not
see.
Interestingly enough. among the measures taken to reassert its claims to
the NWP. the Government of Canada imoediately withdrew its "1970
reservation to Canada's acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
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I . 1 C f J . ,,17 8 d . h' . 1n te rna t a ona ourt 0 us t r.c e , emo n s t ra t a ng to t e a n t e m a t a ona
community of nations its confidence in the validity of the Canadian
claims to the NWP. Further, Canada established straight baselines
d h C d i A . A h i 1 179aroun, t e ana lan rct~c rc ~pe ago.
Conclusions
In terms of the US position on what Washington considers
international waterways worthy of challenge, the lack of consistency in
practice is rather striking. When it comes to challenging Canada's
claims to the Northwest Passage, the US government does not order its
icebreakers to abort their missions.
Clearly, the US does not seem to react as much to the outcry per
~, but to whomever has the power, and the political and military
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capabilities to support its protest. Indeed, Washington retracted
in face of the USSR protest. Obviously the sounds of Moscow did not
fallon deaf ears, and the USSR was listened to by the US. Moscow had
definitely more clout than Ottawa; and, in the world of international
politics, military strength does talk.
From the Canadian perspective, it could be argued that such US
behavior in accepting the Soviet exclusivity over its heavily travelled
~lliP, has in fact undermined the US position on the international status
for the NWP.
What effect has the US action had on Canada-US relations? It is
difficult to establish a cause and effect relationship, but, in November
1985, Canada rejected the US invitation to participate directly in the
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American Strategic Defense Initiative. and allowed Canadian companies to
bid on the so-called "Star Wars" contract.s. However. on March 19. 1986.
Canada and the US signed a five year extension to the NORAD agreement.
and Canada accepted the US invitation to participate in the development
of a manned space station at a cost to Canada of $570 million over the
next decade and a half. On the same occasion. progress was made on a
longstanding irritant to Canada-US relations. the acid rain issue. 181
Further. the thin icy layer covering the initial steps for free-trade
negotiations between both countries has been broken.
If neighborly and friendly relations between Canadians and the US
were damaged. or at least strained. it does appear that differences have
been mended through diplomatic channels by agreeing to disagree and by
the inclusion of a no-prejudice clause in an understanding reached
between both parties prior to the Polar Sea voyage.
Further. other relevant results of claiming the international
waters status for the NWP are that the US is. on the one hand. opening
the waters of the passage to navigation by its most feared neighbors in
the Arctic region. the Soviet Union. and on the other. Washington
reinforces its muscle-wielding big-bad-guy image that some Canadians may
have not only perceived over the years. but accepted:
Apart from legalizing Soviet intrusions. they
(Americans) can only give a new lease on life to those
essentially anti-American forces of extreme Canadian
nationalism who~82inf1uence has much diminished in the
past few years.
If the ultimate goal was to secure passage for US vessels and submarines
in the NWP. the "macho" approach does not appear to have been well
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received by Canadians. And the newly appointed US Ambassador to Ottawa
has acknowledged that
most certainly. it [Polar Sea trip] was not designed to
generate animosity towards the United States among the
Canadian body politic and Canadian citizens. It
certainly was not designed to create an issue between
both governments. Now. experience suT83sts we didn'thandle this as well as we might have.
Insofar as the US position on the status of the waters of the NEP
and NWP. although Washington has always maintained that these are
international waters. one could argue that Canada's action of drawing
straight baselines was exactly what the recent US challenge of the NWP
was intended to bring about. The USSR had already blocked off its
northern sea route with straight baselines in January 1985. Cognizant
of Canada's traditional claims over the NWP waters. Washington must have
assumed that Canada would react to any challenge. If Canada did or said
nothing. the implications would be clear: the NWP waters would be
deemed international and accessible to Soviet vessels. and this.
Washington obviously would not welcome. By drawing straight baselines.
Canada thus needs to ensure the security of its Arctic region. To do so
effectively. Canada must rely upon its longstanding powerful ally.184
the United States. with whom defense arrangements already exist through
the framework of NATO and NORAD.
Further. in consolidating its claims on the Canadian Arctic. Canada
would need also to put forth the funds required to assert in fact its
sovereignty over those waters and to insure its national security. thus
lightly alleviating the US financial commitments for ensuring Arctic
strategic defense. In other words. the US had nothing to lose. and
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everything to gain by challenging Canada's claims. And to top it all.
the US official position on freedom of navigation needed not be
relinquished.
Indeed. the inconsistencies in the practice of US policy on the
freedom of navigation into international waters are to say the least
markedly noticeable. and can be aggravating for friendly states.
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CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY
The examination of the Soviet and Canadian positions concerning
their respective approaches to claiming exclusive jurisdiction over
their northern sea routes has revealed extraordinary commonalities.
Insistence on historicity as a legal basis for these claims combined
with the recent measures of drawing straight baselines constitute the
most astonishing similarities. The USSR has adopted legislative
enactments ever since the 1920's to consolidate its complete control
over the NNSR. But it is only since the early seventies that Canada has
increasingly been resorting to legislative measures in protecting the
internal waters status of its NWP.
The US position toward the international legal status of the waters
of both the NEP and NWP is identical: these are international waters
and the traditional freedom of navigation and the right of innocent
passage apply. The inconsistency of US state practice in relation to
Soviet and Canadian claims is striking.
The Soviet and Canadian Governments have not officially
relinquished the Arctic sector theory as a basis for their claims.
International legal experts in both countries have expressed
interpretative opinions in support of the internal waters status of the
Arctic waterways; they have advocated. especially in Canada. stronger
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action on the part of governments to strengthen Canada's international
legal position concerning its claims to the NWP.
The major difference between both cases lies less in the legal
argumentation in support of the claims. than in Canada's and the Soviet
Union's enforcement capabilities. The Soviet Union as a major maritiole
power and a superpower has forced. by its sheer military strength. the
US to renegate on its challenging ventures into the NEP. As a middle
power. Canada has relied on the avenue of diplomacy to bring about
international recognition of the uniqueness of its Arctic region and the
need to protect its fragile environment. It is unthinkable that Canada
would consider any military action against its friend and ally. the US.
to enforce its claims.
The Soviet Union has established effective control of its passage.
and reserves all rights to grant traversing privileges to foreign
navigation. In 1967. the USSR invited foreign vessels to use its
waterways. Canada is pursuing identical objectives. and has officially
and repeatedly confirmed its intention to render the NWP route operative
for international navigation. Both countries have extended to twelve
nautical miles their territorial seas so as to include essential
gateways to their northern sea routes.
Another significant contrast lies in the fact that the Government
of Canada has repeatedly stressed. quite openly and candidly. its
official position on the internal waters status of the NWP. Silence has
been the golden rule of the Soviet Government with respect to the waters
of the NNSR. Legislative enactments aside. the Government of the USSR
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seems to have relied more heavily on its military capabilities than on
words and statements to assert its sovereignty.
The Soviet claims over the years have been more expansive with the
combination of doctrinal theories and principles. Soviet experts and
authorities have developed the closed-sea principle by virtue of which
several northern seas are claimed as internal waters on basis of history
and "vital interests"; econanic and strategic considerations are
essential components of their global argumentation.
Canada's claims are essentially based on historical habitation and
continuing use of Arctic ice by the Inuit people since time immemorial.
together with the uniqueness of the Arctic environment and the
establishment of straight baselines. The combination of these elements
would not be prejudicial to U.S. interests. and no such basis would
create a precedent allowing for other states to close other
international waterways around the world. l 8S Any resemblance to the
Canadian situation is limited to the NNSR. which is in fact already a
national sea route.
Bilateral negotiations with the United States could ensure future
access to the NWP waters. It is unlikely that Canada would relinquish
any exclusive jurisdiction over these waters in the NWPj however.
Canada-US agreement could well provide for US input into the elaboration
of future rules and regulations governing transit of foreign vessels in
Canada's NWP.
Canada's commitment to increased Arctic surveillance and to develop
the technical machinery to manage effectively its northern waterway
augurs well for future usage of the ~~P. A Northwest Passage Authority
,-
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172The Toronto Star. August 3. 1985. at p. Al and A4: "Ottawa
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External Affairs Minister Joe Clark said Canada had given permission for
the voyage."
173J ul y 31, 1985 News Release, #85/114, Appendix A. p. 2. Also
"Leonard Legault. legal adviser to External Affairs. said "the two
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earned Mulroney any special treatment in the affair of the Polar
Sea •••What is critical is that the 'special relationship' is becoming a
millstone around the government's neck •.. It's a difficult millstone to
89
get rid of. If Mulroney now announced that the special relationship was
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Coast Guard Captain J.B. Wubbold said .•• that. despite what External
Affairs Minister Joe Clark may have said about Canadian observers
guiding the US ship through Canadian waters. the two Canadians will be
nothing more than invited guests •.•• when asked if the two captains would
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Government
of Canada
Gouvernement
du Canada
news release
Date
For release JU~j 31, 198:.
Hie: P GLA ,~ SE~
85/ 11 £1
The Right Ecnou=able Joe Clark, Secre:a=y 0:
State for Ex:~r~al Affairs, the Honourable
Don ~azankowski, Minister of Trans~ort and t~e Honourable·
David Cro~bie, the ~in:ster 0: Indian and Northern
Affairs, announce~ today that Canada has authorized the
U~ited St~tes C~as: Guar= ice~rea~er Palar Sea to ccnd~c:
a .voyage throu~h Canacu's Arctic waters oetNeen Augus: 1
and 15, 1985. T~e vcyage will proceed with Canadian
s~P?ort a~d partic:p~~:o~.
C~na~u and the United States have consul:ed
closely regard:ng plans and ar=ange~ent3 for the voyage.
The Gcvern~e~: of Canada has ~ade clear that
the waters of the Ar c t i c e r ch i pe Lacc , i:1c.!.ud:'ng t:'e
~orthwest Passage, are inter~al waters of Ca~ada and fa.!.l
within Canadian sovereignty. At the sa~e ti~e, the
Government has rea:fi=~ed Canada's longstanding cCw~it~e~:
tc facili~ating safe ~avigaticn in the Ar=tic, SUDject t o
necessary conditions fer the 9reservaticn of its
environ~ent and the welfare of its inhabitants. These
conditions have =een ~et.
The Govern~ent of Canada was infor~ed of plans
for the proposed voyage by the Government of the United
States on ~ay 21. In conveying this infor~ation, the
United States proposed that the voyage proceed on a
cooperative basis, with Canadian participation on =oari
the Polar Sea.
Canada GC . ~J
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While the United States has made known that it
does not share Canada's view regarding the status of these
waters, it has assured the Government of Canada that the
purpose of the voyage i& solely operational, to reduce the
Polar Sea's sailing time to Alaska. The United States has
also formally advised the Government of Canada that the
transit, and the preparations for it, are without
prejudice to the position of either country regarding the
Northwest Passage. It is on this basis that consultations
and the exchange of information have proceeded, and that
Canada has agreed to cooperate in the voyage.
At the same time, however, the Government of
Canada has expressed to the United States its deep regret
that the United States over a period of many years has
been unwilling to accept Canada's sovereignty over the
waters of the Arctic archipelago. While Canada recognizes
that the United States view derives from long-held general
concerns about global freedom of navigation, Canada
nevertheless considers that the evolution of international
law fully supports the Canadian position.
The Polar Sea will enter the Northwest Passage
at Lancaster Sound on or about August 1, 1985 and proceed
through Visc9unt Melville Sound, eJiting the Passage
through Prince of Wales Strait and Amundsen Gulf.
Canada has sought and obtained detailed
information and specific assurances on such matters as the
routeing of the vessel, its design, construction and
equipment, and other requirements for the protection of
the environment, including contingency plans and liability
for costs and damage in the event of a pollution
incident. The Canadian Coast Guard has examined the
drawings of the ship and has concluded it substantially
meets Canadian standards.
The Canadian authorities are satistied that on
the basis of the information and assurances they have
obtained, the United States has taken the necessary
me~sures to ensure that the Polar Sea complies with
standards substantially equivalent to those prescribed
under Canadian regulations, and that all required
precautions have been taken to reduce any danger of
pollution arising from the voyage.
• .• / 3
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An order in council in respect of the Polar Sea
is being issued pursuant to subsection 12(2) of the Arctic
Waters Pollution Prevention Act. This subsection of the
Act was expressly intended to provide vessels owned or
operated by a sovereign power other than Canada, with an
exemption from regulations relating to design,
construction, equipment and manning of vessels, where the
government is satisfied that equivalent standards are met
and sufficient pollution protection is provided.
Canadian officials will be on board the Polar
Sea during its voyage through Canadian waters as observers
and advisors. Mr. Crombie has directed his Inuvik
District Manager to participate in the voyage. Transport
Canada will be represented by two Canadian Coast Guard
icebreaker captains.
Technical support is being provided by the
C~nadian Coast Guard in the form of routeing advice,
communications. and ice reconnaissance. Canadian Forces
aircraft will monitor the progress of the Polar Sea.
If further information is required please
contact Mr. L.H. Legault (995-8901) or Mr. 8.M. Mawhinney
(992-2728).
- 30 -
POLAR SE~ VOYAGE
FACT SHEET
SHIP
The Polar Sea is 122 metres in length, displaces
13,000 tons and 18,000-60,000 shaft horse power. She is
designed to operate in all ice conditions and is deemed to be
designed, constructed and equipped to standards substantially
equivalent to Arctic Class 6 standards (icebreakers are
classified according to the thickness of ice through which they
are capable of navigating). The Polar Sea is one of two pola=
icebreakers in the United States Coast Guard fleet which are the
largest and most powerful icebreakers outside of the Russian
fleet. The Polar Sea can break two metres of ice at three knots
continuously.
ROUTE •
The Polar Sea will depart Thule, Greenland on
August 1, 1985 and transit Canadian waters through Lancaster
SDund and Viscount ~elville Sound, and exit Canadian waters
through Prince of Wales St=ait and Amundsen Gulf. The voyage
through Canadian waters will take approximately 12 days.
CANADIAN PARTICIPATION
Two Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker captains, and
the Inuvik District Manager or the Depart~ent of Indian and
Northern Affairs will be on board the vessel during the
transit. They will serve as observers and advisors.
CA~ADIAN SU?POPT
Canadian Hydrographic charts and publications
covering navigation through Arctic waters have been made
,available to the United States Coast Guard for use aboard the
Polar Sea.
. The Polar Sea will make regular p05ition reports to
NORDREG Canada ln accordance with Canadian Coast Guard notice to
Mariners. NORDREG (the Canadian Coast Guard's ship reporting
system) will provide information concerning ice, weather and
traffic. The Canadian Coast Guard will also be providing
routeing advice, communications and ice reconnaissance services
to supplement those provided by the Department of the
Environment.
MONITORI~G
Canadian Forces aircraft will conduct regular flighcs
to monitor the progress of the voyage. Canadian Forces a ircrew
are trained in ice reconnaissance and pollution protection.
;'1
••• ' L.
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OPERATIONAL VOYAGE
The United States has expressly stated that the
voyage is motivated solely by operational requirements related
to reducing the Polar Sea's transit time to Alaska. Because of
unexpected repair work on two other U.S. Coast Guard
icebreakers, the remaining vessels are on tight schedules.
After assisting in a re-supply mission to Thule, Greenland, the
Polar Sea must proceed to the Beaufort Sea by the shortest
route in order to meets its operating requirements.
ARCTIC WATERS POLLUTIOn PREVENTION ACT
The Act, passed in 1970, requires that waters of the
Canadian Arctic be navigated only in a manner that takes
cognizance of Canada's.responsibility for the welfare of the
Inuit and other inhabitants of the Canadian Arctic and the
preservation of the peculiar ecological balance that now exists
in the water, ice and land areas of the Canadian Arctic.
Section 12(2) of the Act, which deals with foreign
government-owned ships, provides as follows:
"(2) The Governor in Council :;lay by order exempt
from the application of any regulations made under
subsection (1) any ship or class of ship that-is
owned or operated by a sbvereign power other than
Canada where the Governor in Council is satisfied
that appropriate measures have been taken by or
under the authority of that sovereign power to
ensure the compliance of such ship with, or with
standards sUbstantially equivalent to, standards
prescribed by regulations made under paragraph
(l)(a) that would otherwise be apPlicable to it
within any shipping safety contr~i zone, and that in
all other respects all reasonable precautions have
been or will be taken to reduce the danger of any
deposit of waste resulting from t~ navigation of
such ship within that shipping safety control zone."
Section 12(1) of the Act provides for the adoption of
regulations relating to the design, construction, equipment and
manning of vessels, as well as pilotage requirements.
ICE COVERED WATERS MID THE LAW OF THE SEA
Since 1970, the development of international law has
strengthened Canada's right to exercise functional jurisdiction
in Arctic waters. Specifically, at the initiative of Canada,
••• / 3
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the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention provides in Article 234 that
coastal states may adopt and enforce special regulations for
the protection of ice-covered waters. This article, which had
the broad support of the Law of the Sea Conference, gives
validity in international law to the Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act. The Convention also provides, however, that
Article 234 and other provisions relating to the protection and
preservation of the marine environment do not apply to any
warship or any vessel owned , or operated by a state.
Notwithstanding this sovereign immunity, each state must ensure
that its vessels act in a manner consistent with the
Convention, so far as may be reasonable and practicable.
Source:
APPENDIX B
Statement Concerning Arctic Sovereignty
International Legal Materials
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CANADA: STATEMENT CONCERNING ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY*
[September 10, 1985]
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Soverei~nty can arous~ ce~p e~cticn in t~is
c c un z r v . 'T:la~ i s to r e pxr-ec~ec, :0':' s c ve r e i.c n t.y s:-'~~:--:::; ~o
t.h e ve:::y identit: a nd c h a r ac t e r 0: a people. Ve CC'.nadians
want to b e cu r s e Lve s . Fe wa n e to c on c r-o L our own a::a':':::s
and taKe c b a r c e 0: o u r o·....n c e s t i.n y . p..t the s ar.e ti.r::e, ',o/e
Nant tc look beycnd c~':'selves anc to play a ccnstr'Jc:'i.v~
part in a '...c r i d ccrr.·..::1it::' th .3.': <::-0',015 ric r e in':.er;~e~enr::ent.
eve,:,:; yea,:,. ~e have sc~e~~ing to c~:er and sc~e'::,ing ~o
gain in so ~oir.~.
TIle sGverei.snty cues:.icn has concerned thi~
,:c'/er:-"-:1er.t si.nce ·.... e '",'€-re :i.:::s:. 5',0/0:-:1 in. i:e h a v e b u i Lt,
~ati.onal unity, we have s:.:::engt.her.erl the naticnal ~conc~y,
~ecause ur.i.ty ar.d s:.:-eng:.h are hall~ar~s 0: sovereign:.y, as
they are hall~ar~s 0: t~is sover~ent' s ~olic'l and
ac:'ievernents.
In unity and strength, we have taken action to
increase Canadiar. ownersri? of the Canadian petroleu~
industry. v!e have declared ~ Canadian own e r s h Lp po l i c y ir.
re5~ect of foreign i:1ves~~ent in the puclishinS industry.
~"e have rr.af.e our C\1I!1 CanaGian decisions on controversial
issues of foreigr. policy - such as ~Tica:-aqua arid Sout:,
A=:-ica. We have passec the Fcreic:1 rxtraterritcrial
~"easures ~.ct to b Lcc k u n a c c e p e.e c Le c La im s 0: j uri s c i c t Lcn by
~oreisn gover~ents or courts seeking to extend t:,eir writ
to Canaca. y;e have arrested foreign trawlers pcac~.ins in
cur fishing zones. i',"e have taken i.'''rort.ant s t ep s to ::n:;:rove
Canada's defences, notably in ~olste:-ing Canadian forces in
Europe and in putting ir.to ;:-lace a new ~Torth ;'7arning System
to protect Canadian sovereignty over cur norther~ airspace.
~nd we have reconstructect relations with traditional =:-iends
ann allies, who have welco~ed our renewed unity and strer.qt:'
and the confidence they generate.
In ~o~est.ic policy, ir. :oreiq:1 policy, and in
~efence policy, this government has 9iven Canadian
sovereignty a new i~retus within a new ~aturity. Put much
remains, to ~e done. '!"he voyage of the Polar Sea
*[Reproduced from Statement 85/49, Statement in the House of
Commons by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Septem-
ber 10, 1985, provided by the Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C.
[The map at I.L.M. page 1728 is unofficial, although it shows
the position of the baselines set forth in the Order-in-Council,
cited as the Territorial Sea Geographical Coordinates (Area 7)
Order, which lists the numerous coordinates.
[The Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act appears at 9 I.L.M.
553 (1970). Documents establishing related fishing zones appear
at 10 I. L. M. 438 (1971) and 15 1. L. M. 1372 (1976).
[The Canadian withdrawal of the 1970 reservation to Canada's
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. appears
at I.L.M. page 1729.]
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(~e!:1er.strat~c t:--,at. Ca r.a d a , in the p a s z , h a c no z c e v e Lcp ec ~ : le
means to ensure cur soverei~nty ov~r ti~e. Curinq ~hat
v o y a q e . Ca:1a cla's le<;al c La irn wa s ~ully rrotec~ed, but wh e n
'-Ie Loo k od :0:" tanci:::le wa y s to e xe r c i s e our s ov e r e i c nr y , we
~CU:1C-: t::3.:: cur cupb c e r d wa s n e a r Lv ca r s . \':e ch":?':":-:er. f:"~m
t~e Unlted States a :~~al anc exrlicit assuranc~ t~at t:--e
vo va q e c f t;;~ Pclar Sea 'HaS w i t hou c p r e j cd i c e ~o Ca na r' e ' s
legal [-csiticn. Tra:: LS an assurance wric~ the qove!"~ent
0: t::e cay, in 1969, d i d not receive for the vc va c e 0: the
~··anhc1tt~n anc1 0: the ':. ...0 L'nited S:'ates Ccast Guar~
i.c e c r e e k e r s . F"or the ~uture. nori-e p r e j od i c i a L a r r a nc er-e n t s
will nct tP. ~nough.
The ' /cyage o f the ?r.~ar Sea. ras Ie=": no trace en
Ca~dca' 5 Ar~~ic ~c~~~s anc ~o ~a~~ O~ Ca~aca' s ;r~~i~
s 0 '.I e t: e i.S n t..., . I ': i.s :-- e)- i n r. us. .::l. nC au :.- c c n C ern ~ ''': S t t-e .'"hat.
lies a11 ead .
r~any co un t r i e s , i n c Lcd Ln c t.::e t-ni.:.eri ,q t ~ t ~ 5 a n d
the :eceral Re;;'..:::-l':'c 0= Ge~an..." are e c t i v e l y t:':-er-ari:lc :or
cc~rerc':'al nav i c a t i.c n i.n Ar c t i c ·"'aters. Ce'.lelc~!:1ents a r e
,1 c c e I e r 2. tingin ice sci e nC~, ice t e c ~ :1a 1. -::g v , anetan y e r
d e s i.q n , Se'/e:.-al rra j c r .J~?anese :i:":':':5 a r e rreving to car-t'...:=e
the ~ar::et fer:' i.c e r-r e> .... s tankers once p o La r oil arid gas
COlT'e en s t r e arn . so v ; .ub ma r i.n e s are '::'eing rlerloyed un d e r'
the Prc"tic ice pac k , a i. ; the L'nited States ~~avy in tur:1 has
icenti:ied a need to gain Arctic operational experier.ce te
c~unter r.ew ~oviet ceple~er.ts.
t-~=-. S!'eaker,
The implications ~cr Canada are clear. As the
Wester:1 ceu:"ltry with by far the greatest fror.tage on the
Arctic, we must cc~e U.;:J to speed in a range 0: mari:1e
or-eratiens t~at hear on au: capacity to exercise effec"tive
cer.t:el over the Northwest Passage and our other Arc"tic
'...·a t.ers .
To this e~, I wish to ceclare to the Fouse the
~olicy ef t~is geverr.~ent in respect ef Car.adian sovereignty
in Arctic ~aters, an~ to ma~e a nu~ter ef annour.ce~ents as
to how we preFose to give ex?ressien to that policy.
Canana is an Arctic naticn. Tr.e internatienal
ce~~unity has long rece~ni=ed that the Arctic nainland anc
iSlanr.s are a par"': 0: Cana~a li~e any other. Eut. the Ar~tic
i~ not only a par"t e: Canada. It is r~rt o~ Car.ada' s
~rea tness •
The policy of this gcvernMent is to preserve that
greatness undi.r.'tinished.
Ca n a d a' s S 0 v e rei9 n ':.v i :l "theAr c tic is
ir-divisihle. It e!""'::races I a nd , sea, arid ice. It eX"ter.cs
wit~cut interruFtion to "the seawa:"d-=~cing ~=asts 0: t~e
~:-C':.':"c i s t e nc s . ':::pse i s Le r.c s a r e :0 ::e fl and "c:: d':'?':"C:e~ ":" !
:.:--e wa t e r s bec',/een ':.:-.e~. '!:"\ey are ":'r d c e d for rro s t; of t:-:e
year by ice. crc~ t:~e i~e~or':"al Ca::ada' s rn~i:. rec~l~
~~?e us~d and occ~r':'ed the ic~ as ':.~ev ~ave used an~
eccucie~ the lanr..
~e rol,:"cf 0: this c;e'.l'er~e:"".': is to r-a i n t a i n t.:~.e
r.~':.~ral ~r.i':.y 0: t~e Canac':"ar. Frc~~c arc~i~ela0J, ar.~ ~c
~reser'.l'e Canada's sO'.l'e:-eic;n':.y cver land,.sea, and ice
-.:r:d :.:::':"r:ished and u nc i v i c e-t .
That. scve:-eisn,:¥ has .!..en~ teen ~~reld by Canaca.
~'c p r ev i o u s qove=-:-.;::e:"".t. , rO'''';'?'J'e=-, has de:iner' i t s c r s c i s e
lL'":1its or d e Li.n e a t ad Car.ada' s i.:-.t.er:-:al waters a nd
~e~ri~cr~al sea ~~ t~e A~~~~c. ~:s 90ver~~en~ F~~~cses ~o
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lo so. An order in council es:.abl:srinq straiqrt basel:':-:es
~round the ou~e~ ~~~~~e~er c= ~~e C2~acian ;rct~c
archi?elago has tE~r. si.:::ec ':.~dav, a:-:d ""ill cc~e into ef:ect, ..
en ':anuary 1, 192E. ~~se baselines ce':ir.e t::e o u t s r li.~it
0: Canada's historic incernal wa:.ers. Canada' 5 territorial
·,..;aters extend 12 rn i Le s s e a wa r d 0: ':.:-e b a s e Li n es . \o::-.ile t::e
':'er:-i':or::'al Sea ar.d ::'srir.c ~cr.es p..~~ requires EO cays'
r.ot~ce onLy for t.~e es:.a=l~s~~ent cf :i.sheries li.'":1it.s, we
consider that Frior notice sho~ld also be oiver. for th is
L'":1?Or~ant step 0: establish':"r.q strai.sht baselines.
Canada enjoys the s~e ur.dis?uted jurisdic:.i.cn
over its con~ir.ental :narcin anc 2CC-~ile fishing zcne in t~e
~rctic as elsewhere. To prctec~ t~e uniq~e ecolcqical
talance of the regicn, Canada also exercises jurisdic~ion
over a lOO-~ile Follu~ion prevention zone in the Arc~ic
waters. This tco ~as been receqnizec by the inter~a~ional
c cmmun i t.y , through a special rrovisicn in the Un·it.ed ~Tations
C=nvention on t~e Law 0: the Sea.
~~o previous government, howe v e r , has e xz e nd e d th e
aFplication of Canadian civil and cr~~inal la~ to offshore
areas, in the ~Ictic and elsewhere. This government will ~o
so. To this end, ~e shall give priority to the early
adoption of a Canadi.an La'':''s Offshore ArplicC'.ticr: .1\ct.
The exercise of functional juri.sdi~tion ir: Arctic
waters is essencial to C~nadian i~terest~. But i~ can never
serve as a substitute for the exercise of Cana~~' s full
sovereignt-y over the waters of the ~Ictic archirelago. Only
full sovereignty protects the full range of Canaca's
interests. ~is full sovereignty is vital to Canaca' 5
security. It is vital to Canada' s In~it peor-le. ~nd it is
vital even to Canada's nationhoor'.
'!"he policy of this s-overr:r.:ent is t= e xe r c i s e
Canada's full s o v e r e Lq n t y in ar..d over the ',..;a,:ers of the
;. retic arch Lp e Laco . ~':e wi 11 a c c ep z no s ut sti tu t es .
~e r-c1:'cy cf t:--'is <:=overr.r.:ent is also to er.co~=a~e
the develcr~ent. 0: nav~gat:.~cn ir. Canada's Arctic wat:.ers.
",'. . - t iT1 a""" 0 _ .- e "0'" .. "- . e s - .., 1 . - _= r'.. '::'cu r qoal 1.5 0 I •• - - " - ~_ • • ,..; '- c-assage a rea ~_'I --
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Canadian an~ ~c~~iqn sbi?~~ng, as a Canadian wa=e~~ay.
=~vigaticn, ~cweve~, will te sub:ec~ ~= t~e cc~t~=ls an~
c to:: e ~ :": e Ctsur- e 5 r e c ~ :. =- e d : c r C 2. ~ a ~ a 'ss e c I~ r :. t:, , =0 r ':.:-- e
p r e s e r va t Lcn c f :.~~e e~·l:':-=:"~~e~:., a~~r :~'::' :~e .. .,·e ~:a:"e _ .. ::~e
:~ui: anc c~~er :~~a~~ta~:s 0: ~~e Ca~ac:an A=ct.~c.
In due ccu~se, the gcve~n~ent wi~l a~ncunce t.he
':ur<:.:-.~~ s t e p s it is taki.ng to :r.:~le!':1en::. t:-~se pc Li c i e s , a rir'
es~ecially to p~cvide ~o~e extensive ~arine sup~c~~
s e rv i c e s , t.o st=er.g=hen r ec u La c c r y s t rc c t u r e s . ar:~ to
~eir.~orce t~e necessa~y ~ear.s 0: con=~ol. I an anncur.cing
today t~at the 00ver~~en~ has decice~ to cor.st~uct a PoLar
Class G i.c e b r e a k e r . T:1e ~"'inist.e~s 0: ~~aticnal Ce:er.ce a n d
~rar.sport will shor~l: 8ring to Ca~inet r~co~enc'atier.s wi=h
regard to design and cens~ruction plans. The cost.s a~e ve~:
high, in -:':-.e o r d e r cf hal: a ~ill':'cn dolla~s. 2u~ eh i s
governPent is net aceut to conclude that Canada cannot
a:':ord t;;e Arctic. ~'ean·...h i Le , 'Ne a r e tak:ng i~eciate s z e p s
to increase survei~lar.ce ove~:lis;;ts 0': our ~rct.ic wate~s cy
Canadian Forces ai~c~a~. In addition, we are now making
p La n s ':or naval activ:'ty in e a s t e r n Arctic ·"'aters i:l 1986.
Canada is a streno and resnonsi~le ~emMer e: the
international community. Cur strer.g~h and our
resr-onsiMility ~ake us alL the rare aware of the need fer
cooreration with et~er countries, and esrecially with cur
~riends and allies. Coe~eration is neces~ary not only in
~e!ence of our own in-:.erests but in ~~~ence of the cor~on
ir.terests c: t~e :nter=1aticnal co~~unity. Coeper~tien adds
to au t: streng th anl~ in no way d i.."Tl i nish e s our sever e ; sn ty.
The policy of this ~overn~ent is to offer its
cooperation to its friends and allies, and to seek their
cooperation in return.
v;e are pre-~ared to ex p Lo r e with t~e Cn i z e d States
all ~eans of cooperat~on that mi~~t pre~ote the res~ective
interests of tcth count.::-ies, as Arctic frie~~s, neigh~ou~s,
and allies, in the Ar c e Lc waters of Canada and .a~aska.
The ~nited States has ~een Made aware- that Cana~a wis~es to
or-en tal~s on this matter in the near ':uture. Any
cooperation with the ~nited States, or with other ~rctic
n~t~ons, shall only ~e en the ~asis of full res~ect :or
Canada's sovereignty. That tco has ~een ma~e clear.
In 1?70, t~e ~overn~ent of the day carred t~e
International Court 0: Justice from hearing disrut.es t~at
~ight arise concerning t;;e ju.::-isdictie~ e~er=ised "oy Cana~a
:er the preventien of pollution in Arctic wate~s.
'!'his covernment will r emo v e that "oar. r::.deed, we
~ave tocay notified t~e :ecretary Gener~l of t~e Cnited
:·aticns that Canada is wit!"'.d~aw::'nS' t~e 19'70 r e s e r va c Lcn to
; tos accentance 0'= t1-.e ccm o uLs o r v iur:sd':'ctien e': the ~';orld
-- - - . . ~ ....
Coc.:rt.
C:l n ac a •
~e ~rc~ic 1S a heri~aqe :8r t~e ~ecrle 0:
:hey are de~er~inec to %ee? t~eir her:~age en~ire.
172
~e po Lic y c f ~:-:s S"cver:"'_~en~ is ':.0 c i.r e :'..:l1
ex~~~~s~cn tc t~at ce~e~~~~a~~cn.
i;e ch a II e n s: e no est a b 1 : s r. esric r. t S I : ernen e 11 a 'I e
been ~s~ablished exce~t ty Ca~aca. ~e set ~o n~ecece~t :8r
ether areas, :or no ether area can~ares wi~h the Canadian
;rc~ic arc~igelago. ~~~ a=~ c8n~~~e~~ i~ ou= ~csit~cn. ~7e
c e Li e v e in the rule 0: La w in i.n c e r n a c i.c ne I r e I a c i ons . :"e
shall ac~ in accordance ~ith e~r con:idence and belie:, as
~e are doing teeay in wi~hdrawinq the 1?7C rese::-~atien te
Canada's acce?tance e: the ce~r~lsory jurisdicticn 0: the
I~orl.c Cour-:. f'e are ?:-erAre~ ':.0 u ph o Ld c u r p c s i n i c n in t.hat.
Court, i: rie c e s s e r y , a n c to ha v e ; .. :reely and :u11:1 :'Jdged
the:-e.
Ins u fT1Tl a r y , ~ 'r. Spea k ei: , thesearetheM e a sur ~ S ....e
are ~nnouncing today:
1. i~erliat.e acort.ion 0: an order in cour.cil
estatlishirg st.ruiSht. ~aselines areunG the Arctic
e r ch Lp e La oo , to ~e e::ect.iv~ January 1, l'?CG:
2. iMr:':ediate ad oo t i cn of a Car.atiiar. !..a\·/s O::shcre
Ar. r 1 i cat i c n 1\ Ct. :
3. i~~ediate talks with the Vnited States en
eoorer~tion in Pretic wat.ers, on the ~asis of full
respect for Canadian sovereignty:
4.
t:
-.
E.
an immediate increase of surveillance eve::-~lights
of our Arctic waters by aircraft ef the Cunadian
Forces, and ir-nediate planning for CanaGian nav~l
act.ivit.y in the Eastern ~Ict.ic in 10C~:
the Lrrm e d i a t e withdrawal 0: t:--.e 19iO r e s e rv a z i cn
to Canada' s acce~tance of t~e eC~Fulscry
jurisdic~ien 0: the Ir.t.err.a~icnal C~urt. 0:
Jus~ice~ and [*]
cons~ruct.ien 0: a Polar Class a icerrea%er ar.d
urgent consideration 0: o~her ~ear.s 0: exercising
more e:fec':.ive control over our ~rct.ic wat=~s.
Th es e are the measures we can tak e i::".r:-:ed La~el y.
;'Te k now , ho we v ez , t:-.a':. a len~t.er~ eor.-rnit..~ent is r e c c i r ed
v:e are rr1aki:",.g t~at. cer:"",:·71:it..~e:",.t e cd ay ,
*[See I.L.M. page 1729.]
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Sources:
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RECEIVED - REcU
~
S ~ )c . 12 1983
leeJI O;>er:t,cr'.') Di'/i!I::;n (itO)
DirectIon ces Ooer?!iO;Jr .
, '.. /urr1'Ques
WHEREAS Canada has lana maintained and
exercised sovereignty over the waters of the
Canadian Arctic 3rcnipelago.
THEREFORE, HER EXCELLEtJCY THE GOVERNOR
GENERAL IN COUI·jClL, on the r e corune nd a t Lon of the
Sacretary of State for ~xternal Affairs, pursuant
to subsection 5(1) of the !erritorial Sea and
Fishing Zo~es Act, is pleased herehy to make the
annoxed Orderrespectin<j geographical coordinates
of points frOM which baselines may be cete~ined,
effective January 1, 1986.
• "'"I ~ 'T.fL,-_....""
i REGISTERED IN AVTH I,NL1tA
t & REFERRED FOR ACTION, TO· • • p?J_~----:d=~~~liq~L-C-/(OPI~5 REFERRED FOR Il-lFO I
TO:
t·
CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COpy - CaPlE CErlTIF ,EE CCf4FCRME
CLERK OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL - LE GREFFIER DU CONS ElL PR IVE
1985-1582
ORDER RESPECTING GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES
OF POINTS FROM WHICH BASELINES MAY BE DETERMINED
Short Title
1. This Order may be cited as the Territorial Sea Geograohical
Coocdinates (Area 7) Order.
Interpretation
2. In this Order,
"Ac:" means the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act~ (loi)
;'Ar ·::a 7" means the Canadian Arctic Islands and Mainland and
includes all islands and low-tide elevations adjacent to the
Ar e a : (region)
·C.H.S. Chart" means Canadian Hydrographic Service Chart.
(carte S.H.C.)
General
3.(1) The lists of geographical coordinates of points set out
in Schedules I, II and III are hereby issued as lists of
geo~raphical coordinates of points from which baselines may be
determined pursuant to the Act in respect of Area 7.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the geographical
coordinates of points set out in columns II and III of an item of
the schedules are those determined from the chart and edition set
out in column IV of that item.
4.(1) In respect of the poction of Area 7 foe which the
geosraphical coordinates of points arc listed in Schedule I, the
baselines are straight lines joining the points 50 listed.
(2) In respect of the portion of Area 7 for which the
geographical coordinates of points are listed in Schedule II, the
baseline is the low-water line along the coast joining the points
so listed. •
(3) In respect of the portion of Area 7 for which the
geographical coordinates of point~ are listed.in Schedule III,
the baselines are the low-water llnes of the lslands and of the
low-tide elevations.
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1958 Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
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lConvention on the
Territorial Sea and
:the Contiguous Zone
[Note: This Convention, the Convention on
the I/igh Seas {Appendix J). the Convention
01/ Fishing ami Conservation of the Living
Resources 01 the High Seas (Appellllix K).
ami the CUI/vel/tim/ on tire Continentul Shel]
[Appendix L) remained OPL,' lor signature
until October 31. 1958. The Convention Oil
the Territorial Sea awl the Contiguous Zone
came into [orce 01/ September 10. 1964; tire
Convention 01/ the Uigh Seas callie into force
01/ September 30, 1962; the Convention 0"
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the High Seas callie into [orce 01/
Marcil 20, 1966; and the Convention on the
Continental Shelf callie into force 01/ June
10. 1964. The VIIi/eel States formally ratified
all [our Conventions 011 May 26, 1960.]
The States Parties to this Convention
Have agreed as lollows :
I'ART I: T1!ltR 1T00l/AI. SI!A
SECTION I. GENERAL
ART/eLl! I
I. The sovereignty or a State extends, beyond lis land territory and
lts infernal waters, to a belt or sea adjacent to Its coast. described as
Ihe territorial sea .
2. This sovereignty is exercised subject to the provisions or these
urticlcs lind to other rules or international law .
AnTlcu, II
The sovereignty of a coastnl State extends 10 the nil' space over t he
-rrttoria! sea as well as 10 i1s bed and subsoil.
SECTION II. LIMITS OF TilE TERRITORIAL SEA
Anr rci.u III
Except where otherwise provided in these articles, the normal base-
ne for measuring the breadth of the terruorial sea is the low-water
nc along Ihe coast as marked on lurgc-scale churts uffic.:ially recog-
izcd by the coastal Sture.
",nICI .1: IV
I. In loculn ies where the coast linc is deeply indented and cut nuu,
I" if there is a fringc 01 islands along the coast in its inuucdiute
icinity, ihc met hod of st raight baselines juining appropriate points
lay be cruployed in drawing the baseline Irum which the breadth of
. he tcrritoriul sea is measured .
2. The drawing uf such baselines must nol depart 10 any 31'pr c-
iable extent lrom the geucrul dircctlou of the coast , and the sea arcus
ring within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the lund
omuin 10 be subject 10 the regime of interuul waters .
3. Bascliucs shall nut be drawn 10 and Irom low-tide elevations,
mless lighl houses ur similar' installations which arc pcrmancnlly
.bove sea levcl have been built on them.
4. Whcrc the method of struight baselines is nppllcablc UlIlII'. the
u ovisions of paragraph I, account may be lakcn , in delcrmining pur-
icular baschues, of economic interests peculiar 10 the region con-
erncd, the reality and the importance of which arc clcui ly evidcnced
Iy <I long usage.
5. The system uf slraighl baselines may not be applied by a State
n such a man ncr us 10 cui oft [rom the high seas the rcrrlturiul sea
If anot hcr Srarc.
6. The coastnl Sture IIIl1sl cle.uly indicate st ruigh! baselines on
·ha r t s , to which due puhlirity II illS 1 be given .
AHIICLI: V
I. Willl'rs UII lhc 1i.1I,' ·. ·. .1Id sidc of Ihc baselinc of thc Icrrilorial sea
urrll parl of Ihe inlcllI.d walcrs of Ihe Slale .
2. Whcre lhc cstablishmenl of a straighl baselille ill accordance wilh
?
,--""vellllUII UII Ille JI:ll IIOIIW JI:U
article 4 has the effect of endosing as internal waters areas which
previously had been considered as part of the terr ltorial sea or of the
high seas, a right of innocent passage, as provided in all iclcs 14 10 23,
shall exist in those waters .
AltTlCUl VI
The outer limit of Ihe lerrilorial sea is Ihe line every point of which
is at a distance from the nearest point of the baseline equal 10 the
breadt h uf Ihe terrilurial sea.
AIHICUl VII
I. This article relates unly to bays the coasts of which belong to a
single Stale.
2. Fur the purposes of these articles, a bay is a well-marked inden-
tatiun whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its
mouth as 10 contain landlocked waters and constuutc more than a
mere curvature of the coast. An Indentation shall not, however, be re-
garded as a bay unless its area is as large as, or larger than, that of
Ihe semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of
that lndentat ion.
3. For the purpose of measuremenl, the area of an indentation Is
thut lying between Ihe low-water mark around the shore of the in-
dcntutinn and a line joining the low-water marks of its natural en-
trance poinls. Whe,-e, because of the presence of islands, an indcn-
ration has more than one mouth, the semi-circle shall be drawn on a
line as long as the SUIII total of the lengths of tlie lines across the dif-
Icrent mouths, Islands within an Indentation shall be -lnc luded as if
they were part of the water area of the indentation.
4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural en-
trance points of a bay docs nut exceed twenty-fuur miles, a closing
line lIIay be drawn between these two low-water marks, and the
waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as internal waters,
5. Where the distance between the low-water marks of the natural
entrance points of a bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight base-
line of twenty-Jour miles shall be drawn within the bay in such a
manner as to enclose thc lIIaximum area of waler lhat is possible
with a line of lhut length.
6 . The forcguing provisions shall not apply 10 so-c.alled "historic"
bays. ur in any case whcre the straight baselinc syst~rll provided for
in .Irliclc 4 is upplicd.
3
· For the purpose of dcllnutlng the territorial sea, Ihe outermost per-
In:1Ill'1I1 harbour works which form an integral part of the harbour
system shall be regarded as forming part of the coast.
ARnCLI: IX
Roadsteads which are normally used for the loading, unloading and
anchoring of ships, and which would otherwise be situated wholly or
partly outside the outer Iimit of Ihe territorial sea, arc included in
the territorial sea. The coastal Stale must clearly demarcate such
roadsteads and indicate them on charts together with their bound-
aries, 10 which due publicity must be given.
ARTIClE X
I. An island is a naturally-Iormed area of land, surrounded by water,
which is above water 81 high-tide.
2. The lerrHorial sea of an island is measured in accordance with
Ihe provisions of Ihese art ides.
ARTICLE XI
I. A low-tide elevation is a naturally-formed area of land which Is
surrounded by and above water at low-tide bUI submerged at high
tide. Where a low -tide elevation is situated wholly or partly al a db-
lance nol exceeding the breadth of the terrttorial sea from the main-
land or an island, Ihe low-water line on that elevation may be used as
Ihe baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorlul sea.
2. Where a low-tide eleva Iion is wholly situated at a distance ex-
ceeding the breadth of the terrirorlal sea from the mainland or an
island, il has no ter ritorial sea of its own.
ARTICLE XII
I. Whcr~ the coasts of Iwo States are opposite or adjacent 10 each
other, neither of the Iwo States is cutitlcd. failing agreement between
them 10 the conlrary, 10 extend its lerrilorial sea beyond Ihe median
line every poinl of which is equidistant from the nearest points on
Ihe baselines from which the breadth of the lerrilorial seas of each
of the Iwo States is measured . The provisions of Ihis paragraph shall
nor apply, however, where il is necessary by reason of historic title or
other special circumstances 10 delimit the territoriul seas of the Iwo
Slales in a way which is al variance wilh Ihis provision .
l\
Iylllg 0JlJlII~lIe 10 cacn otncr or udjaccut 10 etu.h other shull be nuu kcd
011 large-vcale charts officially recognized by Ihe coastal States.
AIHleLl! XIII
If a river flows directly into the sea, the baseline shall be a straight
line across the mouth of Ihe river belween points on the low-fide line
of irs banks.
SECTION III. RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE
SUU-SECliON A. Rtn .us AI'I'I.IC\nI.E TO Au. SIII1'5
ARrteLl: XIV
I. Subject 10 the provisions of these articles, ships of all States,
whether coastal or not, shall enjoy the right of innocent pass<lgc
through Ihe lerrilorial sea.
2. Passage means navigation through the terrltorial sea for the pur-
pose either of rravcrsiug thai sea without entering inlernal waters.
or of proceeding 10 internal walers, or of making for the high seas
from inlernal waters,
3. Passage includes slopping and nnchoring. bUI only in so far as
the same are incidental 10 ordinary navigation or arc rendered ncces-
s<lry by force majeure or by distress.
4. Passage is innocent so long as il is not prejudicial 10 the peace.
good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall lake
place in conformity with Ihese articles and wilh other rules of inter-
national law.
5. Passage of foreign fishing vessels shall not be considered irIII0-
cent if Ihey do not observe such laws and regulations as the coastal
Sture may make and publish in order to prevent these vessels Irom
fishing in Ihe lerrilorial sea.
6. Submarines are required 10 navigale on the surface and 10 show
their flag.
AIHICU! XV
I. The coastal state must not hamper innocent passnge through the
tcrritorlat sea.
2. The coaslal State is required 10 give approprlate publlcity to allY
dangers to navigation, of which it has knowledge, wilhin its terri-
lorial sea.
s
Altl/l:U: XVI
I. The coastul Sture may lake the necessary steps in its tcrrhorial
sea 10 prevent passage which is nol inuoccnt .
2. In the case of ships proceeding 10 internal waters, the coastal
Stutc shall alsu have Ihe righl 10 lake the necessary steps 10 prevent
any breach of t he condlt iuns 10 which admission of Ihose ships ro
those waters is suhject .
3. Subject 10 the provisions of paragraph 4, the coastal State may,
without discrhuiuat iou amungs! Iurcigu ships, suspend lelllpolarily
ill specified areas of ir s len irorial sea the inuuccnt passage of foreign
ships if such suspcusion is esscru iul fur the protection of its security.
Such suspension shall lake cf lcct only after having been tlllly pub-
lished .
4. There shall be 110 su spension of Ihe innocent passage of foreign
ships IhnHlgh s units which arc used [or iutcrnatiouul uuvigutiou he-
tween one pari of t he high seas and another pari of the high sea s or
Ihe ICITilotial sea of a foreign suue.
AllTl eu: XVII
Foreigll ships exercising the riglu of innocent passage shall comply
with the laws " lid rcgulat ious enacted hy Ihe coastal Sture in COli -
lonllily with i lusc articles a 1111 other rules of intcruatiouul law and,
in purt iculur, with such laws and rcgularious rclaling 10 transporl and
navigution .
SlIll ·SI:CrlllN B. RIII.IiS AI'I'I.ICi\UU! TO MIiH.C1Ii\NT SJlII'S
Alnlel.li XVIII
I . No cha rge may be levied upon Iorcigu ships hy reason only Ilf
their pa~sagc through the terr'itorlnl sea .
2. Cha rges Illay he levied upon a fore ign ship passing through Ihe
tcrritru ial sea as payllll'lIt unly fur specil ic services rendered 10 the
ship. These charges shall be levied without discrimination.
Aurrcr.u XIX
I. The u illlillal juristlicl ion of the coastul Sture shoulll 1101 be ex·
errised Oil hoard a fureign ship passing Ihrollgh Ihe lell ilOI ial sea 10
arrest allY person or III cundllcl any invesligalioll ill conllexion wilh
allY l'Iilll e cOllll n il led Oil hoard Ihc ship during its passage, save only
ill lh l' lolillwillg ('i1'ieo;:
(a) If Ihe (lIl1sl'IlllellCe s uf Ihe clime exlend 10 lhe coaslal Slale; or
b
(b) If Ihe crime is of a kind 10 disturb Ihe peace of Ihe country or
the good order of Ihe territorial sea; or
(c) If Ihe assistance of the local authorltics has been requested by
Ihe captuin of the ship or by the consul of t he country whose
flag Ihe ship flies ; or
(d) If it is lIecessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs.
2. The above provisions do not affect the right of the coastal Slate
10 lake any steps authorized by its laws for Ihe purpose of an arrest
or lnvcstigution on hoard a foreign ship passing through Ihe terrttorlal
sea after leaving internal waters.
J. III Ihe cases provided for in paragraphs I anti 2 of this article,
Ihe coastal Slate shall, if Ihe captain so requests, advise the consular
nuthorlty of the flag Slate before taking any steps, and shall Iacilitatc
contact between such authoruy and the ship's crew. In cases of erncr-
gency this notification may be communicated while the measures are
being taken .
4. In considcrtng whether or how an arrest should be made, the
local authorities shall pay due regard to the interests of navigation.
S. The coastal State may not take any steps on board a foreign ship ,
passing thruugh the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct
any iuvcsf igution in connexion with any c r ime corruuiucd before the
ship entered Ihe territorial sea, if the ship. proceeding from a foreign
port, is only passing through the territorlal sea without entering in -
tcrnal waters .
ARTlCU! XX
I. The coastal Slate should nul stop or divert a foreign ship passing
Ihrollgh the territorial sea for Ihe purpose of exercising civil jurisdic-
tion in relation to a person on board the ship.
2. The coastal Slate lIIay not levy execution against or arrest the
ship for the purpose of any civil proceedings, save only In respect of
uhligaliuns or liabllitles assumed or incurred by the ship i1self in the
COurse or for the purpose of its voyage through the waters of the
coastal Stale.
3. The provisions of the previous paragrclph are without prejudice
10 Ihe right of the coastal Slate, in accordance wilh its I"ws, to levy
c.\Cculion againsl or 10 arrest, for Ihe purpose of any civil proceed·
ings, " foreign ship lying in the lerritorial sea. or passing through the
Icrrilurial sea arler leaving internal waters.
7
SlJlJ-SEcrION C. Rut.us AI'I'UCAUI.U 10 GOVmlNMENT
SIIII'S OIIlEIl TIIAN WAIlSIlIrS
AIHlel.U XXI
The rules contained in sub-sections A and D shal! also apply to gov·
erumcnt ships operated for commercial purposes .
Anr rct.u XXII
I. The rules contained in sub-section A and in urticle 19 shall apply
to government ships operated for nunconuncrciul purposes.
2. With such exceptions as arc contained in Ihe provisions referred
10 in Ihe preceding paragraph. nolhing in these articles affects Ihe
iuuuunit ics which such ships enjoy under these articles or other rules
of intcrnat ionul law.
SlJU·SI.\ liON D. Rul.I: AI'I'I.I CAUl.I l Til WAIlSIIII'S
Aurrcr.u XXIII
If any war ship docs 1101 comply with the regulations of Ihe coastal
S ... te concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards
any request for curnpliauce which is made to it. the coastal State may
require the warship 10 leave the territorial sea.
(',un II: OlNJIf ;1I0IlS ZONE
Auncr.u XXIV
I. In a lone of t he high seas cnntiguuus Iu irs tcrritorlul sea, the
coastal Slate may exercise the COI1II"OI ncccs sary 10:
(a) Prevent infringement of its cus rums. fiscal, inuuigratlou or san-
itury rcgul at iuns within its territory or tcrritoriul sca :
(h) Punish infriugcmcut of the above rcgulutions COlliIII iIIcd within
ih lei ritol y or lcrrilorial sea ,
2. Thc conliguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from
the baseline Ir oru which the breadth uf the tcrrltorlal sea is measured.
J Whcle the coust s of Iwo Stutes are opposjte or adjacent to each
other, uci t he r of Ihc Iwo States is entitled, failing ngrecrncnt between
t hcrn 10 lite c(lntrillY. to extend irs contiguous lOIlC hcyuml the mcdian
line every point of which is cquldistuu! Irom thc nearest poinls lin Ihe
bu scliucs IWIlI which t hc breadth uf the territorial seas of the twu
Siall's is measured.
[Th« Iinnl .ut icle s of t hi s Convention lkalinl; with rutificaf iuu and
nuT.... iou ruul procedure lor I cvi siun have been omit tcd .]
R
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Art Icle 1
Straight baaellnea
1. In loc.lltlea vher. the coaatllne I. deeply Indented and cut Into.
or If there Is a frlnqe of lalanda alonq the coaat In Ita I~dlate vicinity,
the .. thad of atr.lqht b.aellnea jolnlnq .pproprl.te points M.y be ~~ployed In
dr.vlnq the hasellne fro. vhlch the bre.~th of the terrltorl.l sea Is m~••ured.
2. Wh~r. because of the preaence of • delta and other natural
conditions th~ coaatllne Is hlqhly unat.ble, the approprl.t~ point. m.y be
ael.cted alonq the furthest seaward e.tent of the lov-vater line and.
notvlthat.ndloq sUhaequent reqrea.lon 01 the low-v.ter line , the str.lqht
b.aellnea shall rem.,n effective until dh.nqP.d by the co.st.l St.te In
accordance with this Convention .
1. Th. dr.vlnq of straiqht b.selln~s must not ~epart to any .ppreclable
e.tent from the q~n~ral dlr~t'on of th~ coa8t, and ~e s~a .reaR lylnq within
the lines mu.t b~ .ufflclP.ntly closely linked to the land dom.ln to he aUbject
to the r.qlme of Internal vaters.
4. Stralqht b.selinea sh.ll not he dr.wn to .nd fra. low-tide
~1~vationR. unl.ss liqhthouS~B or s'~ilar Installation! which ar~ p~r~n~ntly
abov~ s~a l~v~1 hav@ b~~n built on the~ or ~xc~pt in Instaocp.s where the
drawinq of ba8~iin~s to and froN such el@vatlons has r~c~lved q~neral
internationAl recoqnltlon•
~. Where the ~ethod of stralqht b.ael,nea la appllc.ble under
~~.raqrarh I, ~ccount ~ay b~ t.k~n. In det.r.ininq p.rtlcular baftelln~8, of
~conO~lC int~r.sts p~cullar to th~ r~qlon conc@rn~, th~ reality and th~
Importanc~ of vhich ar~ cl~arly ~vld~nced by 10nq u~aq~.
6. Thp. srste~ of stralqht b.sellnes m.y not he applied by • St.te In
such .a ~ann@r aft to cut otl the territorial s~a ot ano~er State fro. the ht1h
5~dS or an p.cluslv@ @conONIC zon~ .
Article 8
Internal vatera
1. Except.a provided In P.rt IV, waters on the l.ndv.r~ sldp ot the
h~q~llne " f the tprrltorial s~a (or~ p.rt of the internal vaters of th~ Stat~.
2. Where the P.stablls~nt at • str.lqht baapllne In .ccord.nce vlth
ti l"" l'rlpt'lo'" " r t forth In article 1 has th~ effect o( enclosinq .5 Internal
Val,-"r .. ""~!'W vhich had not previ?_~~lt~e_~~_.5.or:'sid~red as such, • r iqht ot
Ir oc ~ t P~~~~qP as provided In this Convpntlon sh.11 p.ist In those watera .
"'r tic le 10
Bays
1. Thla artlcl. relate. only to baya the coaats of vhlch belonq to a
.1"'11. 9tate.
~ . POr the purposes of thla Convention. a h.y la • vell-m.rked
. Ind . n t.a t l on vho.e peneuatlon I. In such proportion to the vl~th of Ita IIOUth
•• to contain land-lock~d wat~r' and constltut~ more then a mere curvature of
lb_ ~.t. An Indentatlon ahall not, however, b. reqarded ••• bay unlc•• It.
ar•• 'e •• lar,_ •• , or l.rqet than, that of the ••• t-clrcl. who •• Jl ••• ler 1.
a lin. dc.vn acro•• the .outh of th.t Indentation.
l. Por the pur pol. of ~•••ure~nt, the are. of an indentatlon •• that
1y109 betw••n the lov-wat.r .ark aeound the ahor. at th. indent.tion and a
lin. jolnl"9 the low-~at.r •• rk ot It. natural .ntr.nc. point.. Wh.r ••
bec.u•• ot the pr ••enc. of l.landa, an indentation ha. aor. th.n one .cuth,
the ae.l-clrcl••hall be drawn on a line a. lonq a. the .u. tot.1 of the
l.ngth. of the line. e"'O•• the dlffer.nt .uuthl . I.l.nd. vlthln an
Inden~atlon .h.ll b. Included •• If th.y were p.rt of the v.ter ar.a ot the
Ind.nt.tlon.
4. It the diat.nce between the low-water .arka at the naturai entrane.
po,nt. of a bay doe. not exceed ~4 n.utlcal .11•••• closlnq line •• y b. dr.wn
between theae tva low-water .arkl, and the water. enclo.ed therebv ~hall b.
con.ldered •• lnt.rn.l vater ••
~ . Wher. the di.tane. betv.en the low-vatee ••rk. of the n.tural
.nUence point. at a bay .xceed. 24 n.utlcal .,le., •• tralqht baseline ot ~4
nautical all •• ahall b. drawn vlLhln the b.y in auch ••anner a. to .nelo••
the ..xl.u••r.a at wat.r thet Ie pos.lbl. vith a lin. of th.t lenqth .
6. The toreqoinq provl8ions do not apply to .o-called ·hi6torLc· bay.,
or In .ny Caa. wh.r. the avate. of atr.iqht ba•• ltne. prOVided for in artiel.
1 ,. applied.
"'rtlcl. 11
Right at Innocen~ pe••age
Subject to thi. Convention! ship. of .11 St.t~ wheth.r coa.t.l or
l.nd-locked, enjoy the right of Innoc.nt pa •••4- through the t.rr'torl.l ••• •
Artlcl. 11
Ne.ning at ~•••g.
1. Pa••ag ...an. nav,gatlon through thw t.rrltorl.l ••• tor the
purpo.e of I
C·I
Cbl
traver.Lng th.t Ie. vLLhout ent.rlnq int.rnal v.t.r. or callinq
.t e roed.teed or port tacl~-riide Int.rnal water., or
,... ----
proc.edlng to or fro. Int.rnal w.t.r. or a call .t .uch
roed.t.ad or port tac,l,ty.
3. ' ••••9••h.ll be conttnuoy••od ,xpedttiQUI. ~w.ver, p ••••q.
includ•••topp,ng and enchorlng, but only In .0 far •• the sa•••r. ,ncid.nt.l
to ordln.ry n.v'gat,on or are r.nd.r.d n.c••••ry by~ •• I.ur. or dl.tr •••
or for the purpo•• of rend.r,ng ••• ,.tance to parlOn., .hip. or a,rcr.tt in
d.ng.r or dl.tz••••
PMT IV
t"I\MT III
S1'1IAITS USED FOR I"Tf:lU/AT IONAL "AVlGAT)(!"
SECTION 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Artlcl. 14
Leg.l st.tus of v.t.rs forming stsalts us.d for
Int.rn.tlonal navlg.tlon
1. Th. r~ql•• of p.ssag. through straits us.d for Int.rnatlon.1
navigation •• t.bllsh.d In this Part sh.ll not In oth.r r••pects .ffect the
l.gal .tatus of the vaters for~lng such straits or the .x.rcls. by the States
bord.rlnq the straits of th.ir sov.reiqnty or 'ur ••diction ov.r .uch vat.r.
and their air space, b.d and subsoil.
2. Th~ sovpr.lgnty or juri.dlctlon of the Stat.s bord.ring the straits
Ie exerclseod '!tuh)ect to this Part and to other rules of internationoll \av.
.xclu.I•• econo.lc .one .nd another p.~t of the high •••• or .n .xcluslv.
econoalc .on.. Howev.r, the requlre..nt of contlnuou••nd .xpedltlou. tran.lt
~. not pr.clud. p••••g. throuqh the .tralt for the pur po•• ot .nt.rinq,
l ••vlnq or r.turnlng fro•• Stat. bord.rlng the .tr.lt, .ubject to the
condition. of .ntsy to that St.t••
l. Any .ctlvlty which I. not .n .x.rcl •• ot the right or tr.nalt
pa••ag. through a .tralt r••aln••ub'ect to the oth.r .ppllc.bl. provision. of
thl. Conv.ntlon.
ARCH' I'EI-'G'C !'TATP:S
ArtiCle 46
Use of t"r.s
Por the purpoe•• of thl. Conv.ntlon.
I.' "archl~l.qlc Stat." ••ans • Stat. constituted vholly by one or
MOre ardhl~lago. and ..y Includ. oth.r Island.,
Nothlnq In this part arr.cts.
Article B
Scop. of this Part
this Part do.s not apply to a strait u••d for Int.rnatlon.l n.vlg.tlon
If there .xlsts through the .tz.lt a rout. through the high •••s or through .n
.xclu.lv. econOMic .one of sl.ll.r convenl.nc. vlth r.s~ct to n•• lgatlon.l
and hydrogr.phical char.ct.rlstlcs, In such rout•• , the other r.lev.nt P.rt.
of thl. Convention, Including the provl.lons reg.rdlng the fre.dOM. of
navlg. t lon and ov.rfllght , apply.
lal
lbl
lei
any areas ot t n t e r na l v.tera v'thin a strait, e.c@pt .here th~
.stabllsh~nt of a stsalght bas.lln. In accordanc. vlth the .. thod
set forth In artlcl. 1 has the eff.ct of .nclosinq as Int.rnal
vaters areola vhich had not preViously been considered .IS sucht
the leqal .tatus of the wat.rs b.yond the t.rrltorlal s••s of
Stat.s bordering stsalts .s .xcluslv. eCOnoMic .on.s or
hlqh s.as, or
the leg.1 rrql.e In strslt. In which passage I. r.gulat.d In whole
or In part by long-standing Intern.tlon.1 CORv.ntlons In fore.
specifically r.l.tlnq to such stzslts .
Artlcl. 36
High s.a. rout•• or rout•• through .xcluslve .conoalc .on..
through sts.its used for lnt.rnational navlg.tlon
lb' ".rchlpelago" ~ans • group of Islands, Including parts of 1.lands,
Interconn~tlnq vat@rs .nd other n.tural features vhlch .Ire 80
clos.ly Intprr.lat~ thst such Islands, vat.rs and oth.r natur.l
f•• tur.s for~ an Intrinsic geographical, .cono-Ic and political
.ntlty, or vhlch hlstorlcslly hav~ b••n r.g.rded •• auch .
Artlcl. 41
Ardhlp!laqlc bas.lln.s
1. An archl~laglc Stat...y drav stt.lqht ardhl~l.glc ha •• lln••
jolnlnq the out.r_oat points of the out.rmost lalandl .nd drying r •• f. of the
.rdhl~l.go prOVided that vlthln such ba •• lln•••r. Includpd the main 1.land•
• nd an ar"a In vhldh the ratio of the areoa of the vateor to the area of the
l.nd, Including atoll., I. ~tw••n 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.
2. Th~ I.ngth of .uch ba.elln•••hall not exceed 100 nautical ~Ile• •
except th.t up to ) per cent of the total number of b••• lln•••nclollng .ny
.rchl~lago •• y .xc••d that l.ngth, up to a m.xlmu~ I.ngth of 12~ n.utlcal
.Ile••
l. Th. dr.vlng ot such ba •• llne. sh.ll not d.part to any .pprecl.bl.
ext.nt fro. the g.n.r.1 conflgur.tlon of the .rchlp.lago.
4. Such bas.llnes .hall not be dravn to and fro. low-tide .l.vstlon.,
unl••• llghthous.s or sl.llar Installations vhlch .r. p.rmanently above s ••
ls•• l ha •• be.n built on th•• or vh.re • lov-tlde .lev.tlon I. situated wholly
or p.rtly at • dlstanc. not .xc.edlng the br.adth of the t.rrltori.l ••• frOM
the n.areet Island.
~. Th~ syst.~ of such b.s.lln.s shall not be .ppll~ by .n .rchlpel.glc
Stat. In .uch a mann.r as to cut off fro~ the high seas or the exclusive
econo.lc .on. the t.rrltorlal s.a of anoth.r St.t••
SECTION 2. TIlANSIT PASSAGE
Artlcl. 11
Scope of thl. section
5. If a psrt ot the .rchlp.l.glc w.ter. of .n .rchlpel.glc St.t. 11••
betv••n two parts of .n Imnedl.t.ly .d'.c.nt n.lghbourlng St.t., .xlstlng
right••nd .11 oth.r leqltl..t. Int.r.st. vhlch the l.tter St.t. h••
tr.dltlonally exercl.ed In .uch w.t.r ••nd all right••tlpul.t~ by .gr....nt
~tveen those St.t•• sh.ll continue .nd b. r••pect~.
this section appll •• to .tralt. which .re ul.d for Internatlon.l
navlq.tlon b~tv~eon one p.rt ot the hlqh s••• or .In exclusive econa-lc Ion.
another part of the hlqh se •• or an eo.clu.lve econOMic zone.
Article )1
Right at tr.n.lt pa ••ag.
.nd
1. Por the purpo.e of cceputlng the r.tlo ot w.t.r to l.nd und.r
p.r.gr.ph I, land ar.a...y Includ. w.t.rs lying within the fringing re.t. or
I.l.nd••nd atolls, Including that p.rt of •• t ••p-.ld~ oce.nlc pl.te.u which
I••nclo••d or nparly .nclo••d by • chain ot llme.ton. 1.I.nds .nd drying
r •• fs lying on the p.rl~t.r of the plat••u.
I. In .ts.it. r.t.rr.d to in .rtlcle )1, .11 .hlp. and .Ircr.ft .njoy
the rl¥ht of tr.n.lt p••a.g., vhlch .hall not b. I~d.dl .xc.pt th.t, If th.
.tralt I. foreed by .n i.l.nd of • Stat. bord.rlng the .tr.lt .nd Its
..Inl.nd, tr.n.lt p••••ge .h.ll not apply If th.r. exl.ts ••aw.rd of th.
I.l.nd • rout. throuqh the high •••• or through .n .xclu.lv••cono~lc .on. of
.1.II.r convenl.nce vlth r.sp~ct to navlgatlon.l and hydrogr.phic.l
characterl.tlcs.
e. The ba •• lln•• dravn In .ecord.nc. with thl••rtlcle .h.ll be .hown
on charts ot a .cal. or .cal•••d~uat. for ••c.rt.lnlng thalr po.ltlon.
Alternatlv.ly, llats of g~raphlcal co-ordlnat•• of point •• specifying the
geodetic d.tu•• • • y b••ub.tltuted •
PART V
ElCLUSI If!: ECONOItIC ZONE
...etlcle 55
Speclrlc leg.l elgl.e or the e.clu.lve econonlc lone
!h. e.clullv. econoMic lone I••n .ee. beyond .nd .dj.cent to the
terrltorl.l .e., .ubject to the specltlc 119.1 r~l.. est.bllshed In thl.
"rt, und.r which the right ••nd jurl.dlctlon ot the COI.t.1 St.te .nd the
right••nd fre~s of other St.te••re governed by the reley.nt proYlslon. or
thl. Convention.
Aztlcle 56
RI,ht. e lurledlctlon .nd dutle. of the coI.t.l St.t. In the
e.clu.lve econo.lc lone
1. In the e.clu.lye econo.lc lone, the co ••t.l St.te h.s.
I.' .over.l9ft right. for the purpo.e of e.plorlng .nd e.ploltlng,
con ••r.lng .nd ..naglng the n.tur.l re.aurce., whether living or
n~llvlnq, at the w.teel luperj.cent to the lee-bed .nd of the
le.-bed .nd It I lublOll, .nd with reg.rd to other .ctlyltle. for the
.eona-Ie e.plolt.tlon .nd e.plor.tlon or the zon., .uch •• the
production ot .nergy tro. the W.ter, current••nd wind.,
Ibl jurl.dlctlon.1 pro.lded ror In the r.l•••nt provl.lon. or thl.
Convention with req.rd to.
III the ••t.bll."-ent .nd u•• or ..tHlcl.l 1.lInd., In.t.llatlon.
and .~uctur•• ,
1111 ... Ina .c1entHlc r ••••rch.
1111' the protection .nd pre.erYltlon at the -arlne envlronNent,
Icl other rlghtl Ind dutle. proYlded for In thl. Conyentlon.
2. In e.ercl.lng It. rlghtl .nd perforMing It I dutle. under thl.
COnvention In the ••cluBtve .canonic zon~ , the c oas t a l Stat~ ~hal1 have due
reg.rd to the right. and dutle. or other StItes and .h.ll act In • ~nner
cOMp.tlble with the proyl.lon, of thl. ConYentlon.
l. Th. rl9ht••et out In thl••rtlcle with re.pect to the 'e.-bed .nd
• ubecll .hall bft e.ercl••d In accord.nce with P.rt VI.
Aztlcle 57
Br••dth or the e.clu.IYe eeono.lc zone
The e.clu.l.e econOMic zone .h.ll not e.tend beyond 200 n.utlc.l aile.
rr~ the ba~ellnp. frc. which the bre.dth or the terrltorl.l .e. I. M•••ured.
PUT IX
ENCLOSED O~ SEHI-ENCLOSED SEAS
Article 122
Definition
For tn. p~rpo••• of tnl. Convention, -encloaed or .e.i-encloa.d ••••
•••n•• 9ulf, baSin or s•• surrounded by two Or -are Stat•••nd conn.ct.d to
.not.h.r ••• or the ocean by • narrov outlet or conslBtln9 entirely or
pri~rlly of the terrllorlal sea. and e~clu.ive econa-lc zan•• ot tWO or .cr.
co•• ~.l St.tes.
Article 12l
Co-op.e.tlon of St.tel boedlelnq Ineloled
or 5eai -encloeed Sea.
St.t•• boedeelng .n .nclo••d oe ••• l-enclo••d ••• Ihould Co-op.r.t. wltn
••ch oth.e In the •••rcl •• at th.le eight ••nd In the pertor ••nce of theIr
4utl •• undee thl. COnyentlon. To thl ••nd th.y .h.ll .nd••your, directly or
theough .n .ppeopcl.tl e.glon.l oeg.nll.tlon.
Ie' to co-ordinate the ..na9c..nt, con••rv.tlon, e.ploratlon and
.xplolt.t.on at the llYlng r ••oure•• or the .e.,
Ibl to co-ordln.t. the I.pl...nt.tlon of th.lr rlqht••nd dutl •• with
r.apect to the protection .nd pr •••ry.tlon ot the ..rin.
.nvlron-ent,
lcl to co-ordln.t. th.lr .cl.ntltlc r •••• rch pollcl•••nd undert.ke
wh.r••pproprl.t. Joint proqr ..... at .cl.ntltlc r •••• rch In
the .r•• ,
Id' to Inylt•••••ppcoprl.t., oth.r Int.r•• t.d St.te. or Int.rn.tlon.l
org.nll.tlon. to co-op.r.t. with the. In turth.r.nce ot the
provl.lon. at thl••rtlcl • •
PMT XII
PlIan:CT ION AND P~ESUVl\T ION or TNE KARINE ENVI~OM'lDlT
SECTION 2. CLOaAL AND RECIONAL CO-OPEAATION
Art Icll 197
CO-Op!r.tlon on • ,lOb.l or reglon.l b•• l.
St.te••h.ll co-oper.te on • glob.1 b•• I. Ind, a••pproprl.te, on •
reglon.l b•• I., directly or throuqh co~petent Internatlon.l orqanlz.tlon., In
ror.ulatlng .nd .l.bor.tlng Int.rn.tlonal rul •• , .t.nd.rd••nd reco~ended
practices and procedures consistent with this Conv.ntlon, for the prot~cllon
and pre••rv.tion of the ..rln. environment , t •• lnq lnto ac count characteristic
reglon.1 re.tures .
Art lele 198
Notltle.tlon of I~inent or actu.1 d...qe
....en A State beco.e. aware of case. In which t.he _.r lne env lruum,.nt I.
In l __ lnent d.nger of betnq da.aq~d or ha. been da"ged by pollull (HI . It ~ h . l l
I...dl.tely notity other State. It deeM. likely to be alfected by .u~h d.~.~e.
•• vell •• ~he co.petent international or9ani,atlona.
Art IC1e 199
Contingency plan. ag.lnlt pollution
In the c•••• r.t.rred to In .rtlcle 198, St.te. In the .re••ffect~, In
.ccord.nce with th.lr c.pabilitle., .nd the eo.petent Intern.tlon.l
organlutlon••h.1l eu-operate, to the •• t.nt po •• lbl., In ell.. lnat Inq the
.tt.ct. or pollution and pr.Yentlng or .lnlMlllng the d...q.. To thl. end,
St.t•••h.1l jointly d.Yelop .nd promote contlnqency pl.ns for relpondl"., to
pollution Incld.nt. In the •• rln. enyiron..nt.
Art tcte lUU
Studl •• , re.e.rch p<0qra.....nd e.dh.nqe ot
Intor..tlon and d.t.
St.t•• ah.ll co-oper.te. dlr.ctly or throuqh caepetent Int.rn.tlon.1
orq.nll.tlon•• for the purpo.e of pro.atin, .tudl••• undert.klnq proqra.-es of
.clentlflc re••• rch .nd encour.qlnq the ••ch.nqe ot Intor.. tlon and d.t.
• cqulred about pollution ot the a.rine envlron..nt. They .h.ll en~e.vour to
partlclpat••ctlv.ly in req.oo.l .nd qlob.l proqraae•• to .cqulr. knowl.dq.
tor tn nt of the n.ture .nd e.tent of pollutlon, eapo.ur. to It, and
It. pathw.y•• rl.k••nd r.eedl •••
Articl. 201
Scl.ntl(lc crlt.ri. for r.qul.tlon.
4. Coast.1 St.t •• m.y. In the e ••rcl.e ot t~elr .overelqnty within
th.lr t.rrltor1.1 se., adopt lawa .nd r.qul.tlona for the prevent lon,
r.ductlon .nd control o( ear'ne pollution tro. forelqn ve ••el •• Includlnq
v•••• l. e.erc.sinq the r.qht o( Innoc.nt pa •••q• • Such l.w••nd requl.tlon.
.h.ll, in .ccord.nc. with P.rt II, sectlon l, not h.~r lnnocent p ••••qe of
tor.iqn vess.ls •
s. eo.st.l St.tes, for the purpose of enforce..nt .a provided tor In
••ctlon 6, aay In re.pect of the1r e.clu.1ve econo-ic Ion•••dopt l.~s And
r.qulatlon5 for the pr.v.ntlon, reductlon and control of pollut1on rro.
v•••• l. confora1nq to and q1v1nq .ff.ct to qen.r.llv .cc.pted Internation.l
rul•••nd st.nd.rds •• t.bll.hed throuqh the co.petent Int.rn.tlon.l
orqanilat1on or qener.l dlpl~tic confarence .
In the l.qht at the In(or.. tlon and d.t••cquir.d pur.uant to .rtlcle
200 . St.t•••h.ll co-oper.te. dlr.ctly or throuqh compet.nt Int.rn.tlon.l
orq.nil.tlon•• In •• tabli.hlnq .pproprl.t. scientltlc crlt.rl. for the
tor.ul.tloo and .laborAtion ot rule., Itandar .11 and reee-n.nded practi ces .nd
procedur•• for the pr.v.ntion, r.duct10n and ,-', ll t r o l at pollution o( the
•• rln. envlron..nt.
sacrlOll 5. IHTERICATIONAL RULES AND ICATIONAL U:CIsv<TIOH ro PR£~T,
R£D~ AND COllT1l0L POLLUTION or THE KAIIIN!: DlVIR~
Artlcl. HI
Pollution (roe v••••l.
1. Stat.s. actlnq throuqh the coepet.nt Int.rnatlonal orq.nllatlon or
,.n.ral dlplOftatlC cont.r.nc•••hall •• tabll.h Int.rnatlonal rule. and
.t.ndards to pr ..v.nt. reduce and canuol pollution of the ..ar In••nvlronm.nt
tro_ ve••els and prOMOte the adoption, In the ••.e .ann~r, wherever
.pproprl.t•• of rout.lnq .y.t.a. d•• lqn.d to .Inlall. the thr •• t ot accld.nt.
which alqht cau•• pollution of the aarln••nvlronMent. lncludlnq the
coa.tlln•••nd pollution daaaq. to the r.lat.d lnt.r•• t. at coa.tal Stat•••
Such rul•• and .t.nd.rd••hall. In the s.-e eann.r. b. r.-••••ln.d fron tl..
to tine aa n.~••sary.
2. St.t•••h.ll adopt l.w. and r.qulatlons for the pr.v.ntlon,
reduction and contr ,-1 o f pollution of the ~rlne enylr~ent fro. v••••l.
tlylnq th.lr tlaq or ot th.lr ra,lauy. Such law. and r..ul.tlon••hall .t
l ••• t h.v. the ••••• ff.ct •• th.t ot q.n.r.lly acc.pt.d Int.rnatlonal rul ••
and .tandard. e.tabll.h.d thr0U9h the coapet.nt Int.rnatlon.l orqanllatlon or
,.n.r.l dlploeatlC cont.r.nc••
6. (., Wh.r. the Int.rn.tion.l rul•••nd .t.nd.rd. r.terr.d to .n
p.t.'.lqr4ph 1 .. r. in.ldequate to lIeet spKlal clreu_stAnce-s .,uuJ
c~stal State. have reasonable qrounds (or bellevinq that ..
particular, cleArly defined ar •• of their respective e.clus1ve
~nOd1C lones ·i. an .Ire. ~her. the .doption of special ~nd.tory
.~4sures tor the preventaon of pollution fro~ vessel. 1& reqUired
(or rec~nl1ed teenn1c.1 rea.on. in relAtion to 1ts oce.noqraphical
.nd ecoloq1cal cond1tlons, a. veil a. It. ut1111.t1on or the
protection of lts reaourc•••nd the particular charActer 01 lts
tr.ff1c, the coastal Statea, after appropriate consultatIons
throuqh Lh. ce-pctent int.rnAtlon.l or9.n1.at100 with any oUher
StAte. concerned, .ay, for thAt are., direct a co-munlc.t.tlon co
thAt orq.n1Z.lt10n, .u~ltt1n9 aC1entltie and technical evidence 1n
support .nd 1nfor.at10n on nec••sary rec.ptlon facll1tles. W1thin
12 ~nth • .If tar rec.1vinq .uch a ca.aunlc.ltion , the orq.01z4t100
shAll d.ter.1n. whether the conditions tn thAt .r•• correspond to
the r~uire..nt. aet out above. It the orq.n11.tlon ao d.ter.lnel ,
the co•• t.l States ••y, ror thAt .r •• , .dopt IAwa .nd cequlationl
for the prevent lon, reduction And control of pollution tro. ves •• l,
Impl...ntinq .uch int.rn.t1onal rule. and .tand.rd. or nAv1q.tional
pr.ctlc•••• ar ...d••ppllc.bl•• throu9h the orq.nll.tlon. (or
.pecl.l .re.s. Th.s. l.w••nd r.qul.tlon••h.ll not beco••
• ppllc.bl. to (or ••qn ve•••l. until 15 aonth••tt.r the sub•• s.lon
of the co~unlcatlon to the Or9.1nilat1on .
(b' Th. coa.t.l St.t•••h.ll publl.h the 11.lt. ot any .uch
p.rtlcul.r. cl••rly d.(lned .r•••
l. Stat•• which .stabllsh particular requlr...nt. tor the pr.v.ntlon.
r.ductlon and conUol of pollution of the ..r.n••nvtroneent ••• condition
for the .nuy o( for.I9O v•••• l. Into th.lr ports or Int.rn.l wat.r. or tor.
c.ll .t th.lr off-shore t.raln.la .h.ll qive due publicity to .uch
r.qulr ....nt••nd sh.ll coeaunlc.t. th•• to the co.pet.nt Int.rn.tlon.l
orq.nll.tlcn. Wh.n.v.r .uch requlr.ments .r••• tabll.h.d In Id.ntlc.l tora by
two or .are co•• tal Stat•• in an .nd.avour to har~ll. policy, the
coeaunlc.tlon .h.ll .nd.c.t. wh.ch St.t•••r. partlclpatlnq In .uch
co-oper.tive .rr.nq....nts. EV.ry St.t••h.ll requlr. the ••• t.r ot • v•••• l
flyln9 Its tl.q or of It. r.ql.try. wh.n n.vlq.tlnq within the t.rrltorlal •••
of • St.t~ partlc.pat.nq in .uch co-oper.tlv••rr.nq...nt•• to turnlsh. upon
the reque.t o( that St.t•• infor..tlon •• to wh.th.r It I. proc••dlnq to •
Stat. of the s.-e req100 pArtic1pAting in such co-operAtlv. acr.nq•••nts .nd,
If eo, to .ndlc.te whether It CQOIpU•• with the port .ntry requlr ....nt. at
th.t St.te . Tn.s artlcl. Is w.thout pr.,udlc. to the contlnu.d ••• rcls~ by •
v•••• l o( .tl r.qht o( innoc.nt pas••q. or to tne .ppllc.tlon ot .rtlcle 2S.
par.qr.ph 2 . •
(cl It the coa.t.l St.te. Intend to .dopt addltlon.l l.v••nd
r.qul.tlon. tor the .... ar•• tor the pr.v~ntlon, reduction .nd
control ot pollution (roa v•••• l •• th.y sh.ll. vh.n .ubalttlnq the
.tor••ald cae.unlc.tlon, .t the .... tlee notlty the orq.nll.tlon
th.reot. Such .ddltlon.l l.w••nd ratul.tlon. eay r.l.t. to
dl.ch.r,e. or n.vlq.tlon.l practice. but .h.ll not requlr. tor.lqn
ve ••el. to observe de.1qn, cOn.~uctlon...nninq or equipeent
stand4rd. other thAn qeoer41ly .ccepted 1nternat10n.l rules And
.t.nd.rd•• th.y .h.ll b.co•••pplic.bl. to tor.lqn v••••l. 15
.an~1 .ft.r the lub.llsion 0' the cOaDunicAtion to the
orq.n.".tlon. provided th.t the orq.nil.tion .qr••• within 12
.onths art.r the lub.1tl10n of the co-.un1cation.
7. The internat10nal rule. and standards referred to in Lhi. article
should includ. Int.r .11. tho•• r.l.tinq to pro~pt notltlc.tion to co.st.l
StAtel, whose CO.ttl1Re or related 1nterest • • • y be affected by incidenta,
includlnq ••r1t1.. casualt1es, which involve d1lch.rqel or probab11 ity of
d ••ch.rq•••
SECT ION 8. ICE-COVERED AREAS
Article 2H
Ice-covered are••
COa5tai Stat.s have the rlqht to .dopt and enforce non-dl.crl.ln.tory
l.w. and r.qul.tlon. for the prevention, r.ductlon .nd control of m.rln.
pollution rro. v••••l. 1n lce-eovered ar ••• wl~ln the li.ita or the eacluatve
econonlc zon •• wh.r. p.rtlcul.rly ••v.r. cll..tlc condition••nd the pr •••nc.
of ic. cov.rlnq such .r.a. for .o.t of the y••r cre.t. Ob.lcruetlons or
.xceptlon.l h.z.rds to navlqatlon••nd pollution of the m.rln. environMent
could c.u.... )or h.rm to or Irrever.lbl. dl.turb.nce of the ecoloqlc.l
b.l.nc•• Such I.w. and requl.tlon. sh.ll h.v. due req.rd to n.vlq.tlon .nd the
prot.ctlon .nd pr.s.rv.tlon of the ~rln. envlron.ent b.sed on the b•• t
.v.il.bl. scl.ntlflc evidence.
SECTION 9. RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY
Artlcl. 215
Re.pon.lbility and liability
I. Stat.S ar. r.spon.lble for the fulfilment of their Int.rn.tlon.l
obliqatlons c onc e r n i nq the protection and preservation or the marine
enVlron••nt. They shall be llabl. In accordance with Intern.tlon.l l.w .
2. States .hall ensure th.t recour •• Is .v.ll.ble In .ccord.nc. with
th.lr leq.l sy.t.~s for pronpt and adequ.te compens.tlon or oth.r r.ll.f In
r.sp.ct of da __qe cauo.d by pollution of the m.rlne envlron_ent by n.tur.l or
Jurldlc.l p.roon. und.r their jurisdiction.
) . With the objective of •••urinq prompt .nd adequ.te compen •• tlon In
r.spect of .11 da..q. c.u.ed by pollution of the ..rln. envlronaent. St.t••
sh.ll co-oper.t. In the Imple..nt.tlon of .xl.tlnq Intern.tlon.l l.w .nd the
furth.r d.v.lopment of int.rn.tlon.l l.w r.l.tlnq to re.pon.lbility .nd
ll.bliity for the nt of .nd compens.tlon for d q••nd the .ettl nt
of r.lat.d disput.s ••s w.ll as. where .pproprl.t•• develoPNent of crlterl •
• nd procedure. for par-.nt of .dequ.t. compens.tlon. such •• co~pulsory
insurance or co-pe naat io n funda .
SECTION 10. SOVEREIGN IHHUNITY
Articl. 2J6
SOv.relgn I_unity
The provI.lons of th is COnvention r.q.rdlnq the protection .nd
preaervation of the ••rlne env iron-ent do not apply to any war.hip, naval
.uxIII.ry. oth.r ve••• l. or .Ircr.ft own.d or oper.t.d by • St.t••nd u.ed,
lor the ta .. balnq. only on qoveln8ent non-co~rci.l service. HQwever, .ach
St.t. oh.11 .n.ure, by the .doptlon of .pproprl.t....sur•• not Impeirlnq
oper.tlon. or oper.tlon.1 capebilltl•• of .uch v••••l. or .ircr.ft owned or
op.r.ted by It. th.t .ach ve•••l. or .1rcr.ft .ct In ...nn.r con.l.t.nt, .0
f.r •• IS r •••on.bl••nd pr.ct1c.ble, ~IUh thl. Conv.ntlon.
APPENDIX F
Straits Essential for Navigation in the Northeast Passage
Source: Butler. W.E.: Ibid.; at p. 39. 40 and 41.
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STRAITS WITHIN AN ARCTIC SEA
OF TilE NORTHEAST PASSAGE
Strait Least Width Location
Kil'din Strait Y2 mile Barents Sea
Orlovskaia Salma Strait 9 miles White Sea
Gorlo Strait 25 miles ..
Vostochnaia Solovetskaia
Salrna Strait [narrow}* ..
Zapadnaia Solovetskaia
Salrna Strait [narrow) ..
Anzerskaia Strait 3,4milc ..
fairway
Zhizhginskaia SaJma Strait '/8 mile
"Sosnovskaia Salma Strait 1'/2 miles ..
Kostin Shar Strait 2/3 mile Novaia Zemlia
Shirokii Strait 700 yards ..
Uzkii Strait 1100 yards ..
I'ctukhovskii Shar Strait 400-600 Kara Sea
Least Width Location
STRAITS CONNECTING lWO ARCTIC SEAS
OF THE NORTHEAST PASSAGE
..
"
Dikson Island
"
"
"
Kara Sca
"
..
..
"
"
Kara Cates Strait
Novaia Zemlia
..
..
"
"Franz Josef Islands
Kara Sea
Minin Skerries
Nansen Island
Bonevyi Island
East Siberian Sea
Taimyr Islands
Kara Sea
N ordenskjold Archipelago
Laptev Sea
Least Width Location
~/2 mile
l~ miles
2~~ miles
17 miles
5 miles
4'12 miles
6 miles
4 miles
15 miles
2/ l mile
[narrow]
4'12 miles
[narrow]
[narrow}
lY2 miles
22 miles
1 mile
' 2 miles
[narrow]
3,4 mile
1 mile
1Y2 miles
[narrow]
1'/2 miles
2Y2 miles
1 mile
1 mile
[unknown}
lY2 miles
7Y2 miles
[unknown)
[unknown)
Nikol'skii Shar Strait
Krotov Strait
Kazakov Strait
British Canal Strait
Austrian Strait
Markham Strait
Nightingalc Strait
Meyers Strait
De-Bruyn Strait
Morozov Strait
Sharapov Shar Straits
Malygin Strait
Lena Strait
Proven Strait
Vega Strait
Ovtsyn Strait
Krestovskii Strait
Dubravin Strait
Glubokii Strait
Stalinets Strait
Inci Strait
Fram Strait
Sverdrup Strait
Zaria Strait.
Palander Strait
Toros Strait
Vostochnyi Strait
Matisen Strait
Maud Strait
Murmanets Strait
Melekhov Strait
(Kolyma River) Strait**
Strait
.. The least width of straits designated as [narrow] is not known but is be-
lieved to be six miles or less.
.... This strait apparently is unnamed, though described in the Arctic Pilots
cited in note 1 of this chapter.
Barents-Kara Sea
Barents-Kara Sea
Barents-Kara Sea
Kara-Laptev Sea
Kara-Laptev Sea
Kara-Laptev Sea
Kara-Laptev Sea
Laptev-East Siberian Sea
Laptev-East Siberian Sea
Laptev-East Siberian Sea
Laptev-East Siberian Sea
Laptev-East Siberian Sea
East-Siberian-Chukchi Sea
Chukchi-Bering Sea
Table 2
5Y2 miles
29 miles
Y2 mile
22 miles
IOYl miles
1Y2 miles
3 miles
30 miles
10 miles
30 miles
25 miles
(unknown}
75 miles
2 miles
Iugorskii Shar Strait
Kara Gates Strait
Matochkin Shar Strait
Vil'kitskii Strait
Shokal'skii Strait
Red Army Strait
Yungshturm Strait
Dmitrii Laptev Strait
Zaria Strait
Sannikov Strait
Blagoveshchensk Strait
Eterikan Strait
Long Strait
Bering Strait
Strait
APPENDIX G
1983 Rules for Navigation and Sojourn of Foreign Warships
in the Territorial and Internal Waters of the USSR
Source: International Legal Materials, vol. XXXIV. no. 6,
November 1985; at page 1715-1722
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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: RULES FOR NAVIGATION AND
SOJOURN OF FOREI~~ WARSHIPS IN THE TERRITORIAL
AND INTERNAL WATERS AND PORTS OF THE U.S.S.R.*
RULES FOR NAVIGATION AND SOJOURN OF FOREIGN WARSHIPS
IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS (TERRITORIAL SEA) OF THE USSR
AND THE INTERNAL WATERS AND PORTS OF THE USSR
I. General Provisions
Article 1 Contents and Application
The present Rul es sh all establish the procedure for the effectuation by
foreign warships, as well as by underwater means of transport, of innocent
passage through the territorial waters (territorial sea) of the USSR and the
procedure for their entering and sojourning in the internal waters and ports
of the USSR.
Article 2 Duties of Foreign Warships 1£ ElY Their~
Foreign warships must fly their naval or state flag while navigating or
sojourning in the territorial waters (territorial sea) of the USSR and the
internal waters and ports of the USSR.
While a foreign warship is anchored in a port of the USSR, the flag may
be raised and lowered in accordance with national rules.
Article 1 Foreign Submarines and Other Submarine Means of Transport
The entering and sojourning of foreign submarines and other underwater
means of transport within the limits of the territorial waters (territorial
sea) of the USSR and the internal waters and ports of the USSR shall be
permitted only while on the surface.
Article! Duty Qf Foreign Warships 1£ Observe Navigational and Other
Rules
Foreign warships shall, while navigating and sojourning in the
territorial waters (territorial sea) of the USSR and in the internal waters
and ports of the USSR, be obliged to observe radio communications,
navigational, port, customs, sanitary, and other rules.
In the event of the forced non-observance of rules for navigation and
sojourn in the territorial waters (territorial sea) of the USSR and in the
internal waters and ports of the USSR, the commander of the foreign warship
1715
*[Translated from the Russian text in Izveshcheniia moreplavateliam,
no. 1 (1984), item 15, pp. 79-85, by William E. Butler, Director of
the Centre for the Study of Socialist Legal Systems, University College
London, and I.L.M. Corresponding Editor for the U.S.S.R.; reprinted from
W.E. Butler, COLLECTED LEGISLATION OF THE USSR AND CONSTITUENT UNION
REPUBLICS (Dobbs Ferry: .Oc e a n a Publications, 1979-).
[As the U.S.S.R. is t~e largest maritime power to have signed the
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Soviet concept and defini-
tion of innocent passage for warships becomes the principal standard by
which the convention provisions on the subject will be construed. Soviet
policy on innocent passage r e f l e c t e d in the rules reproduced in t~is is-
sue of I.L.M. represents ~he complete r sversal of Soviet doctrinal views
uttered since the Second World \~ar o~ the rights of foreign warships to
exercise a right of innoce~t passage.]
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must immediately notify the administration of the nearest Soviet port thereof.
Article 2 Pilotage and Icebreaker Service
While navigating and sojourning in the territorial waters (territorial
sea) of the USSR and in the internal waters and ports of the USSR, foreign
warships must use the services of the pilotage and icebreaker services in
those areas where pilotage or icebreaker service is compulsory.
Article ~ Areas Prohibited for Navigation
Within the territorial waters (territorial sea) of the USSR and the
internal waters of the USSR foreign warships must not enter areas in which by
decision of the competent Soviet agencies the navigation and sojourn of
foreign warships is prohibited.
The establishment of such areas shall se announced 1n Notices !Q
Mariners.
Article I Failure to Observe Established Rules
1. In the event a foreign warship, the floBting means thereof, or its
aircraft, or its personnel fail, while navigating or sojourning in the
territorial waters (territorial sea) of the USSR or the internal waters and
ports of the USSR. to observe Soviet laws and rules. a demand shall be
submitted to the commander of the foreign warship (or detachment) that they be
observed.
2. A foreign warship which ignores any demand directed thereto to
observe the laws and rules of the USSR may be asked to immediately leave the
limits of the USSR territory.
II. Innocent Passage
Article ~ Right of Innocent Passage
Foreign warships shall within the territorial waters (territorial sea) of
the USSR enjoy the right of innocent passage on condition of observing the
provisions of the present Rules. the laws and rules of the USSR relating to
the regime of the territorial waters (teritorial sea) of the USSR, as well as
of international treaties of the USSR.
Article 1 Purposes of Innocent Passage
The innocent passage of foreign warships through the territorial waters
(territorial sea) of the USSR shall be effectuated for the purpose of
traversing them without entering the internal waters of ' the USSR or for the
purpose of passage into the internal waters and ports of the USSR or of
putting out from them to, the high seas.
Article 1Q Concept of Innocent Passage
Passage shall be innocent so long as it does not breach the peace, good
order. or security of the USSR.
Such passage must be continuous and expeditious. It may include stopping
and anchoring incidental to o~dinary navigation or necessary as a consequence
of Insuperable force or distress, or for the purpose of rendering assistance
to persons, vessels, or aircraft, ~n danger or distress.
Article 11 Conditions Qf Innocent Passage
1. When exercising innocent passage in the territorial waters
(territorial sea) of the USSR a foreign warship shall be prohibited from an y
of the following types of activity:
a threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity,
or political independence of the USSR, or in any other manner in violation of
the principles of international law embodied in the United Nations Charter;
any maneuvers or training with weapons of any kind;
any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense
or security of the USSR;
any act of propaganda aimed at infringing the defense or security of the
USSR;
the launching, landing, or taking on board of any aircraft or any
military device;
the loading or unloading of any commodity, cargo, or cu~rency, or the
landing or boarding of any person, without the authorization of c;,mpetent
Soviet agencies;
any act or willful and serious pollution of the environ~ent;
any fishing activity;
the carrying out of research or survey activities;
any act aimed at interfering with the functioning of any systems of
communication or any other facilities or installations of the USSR;
any other activity not having a direct relationship to passage.
2. The passage of a foreign warship shall not be innocent if it commits
the actions prohibited in accordance with point 1 of the present Article.
Article 11 Routes and Traffic Separation Syste~s
1. Th innocent passage of foreign warships through the territorial
waters (territorial sea) of the USSR for the purpose of traversing the
territorial waters (territorial sea) of the USSR without entering internal
waters and ports of the USSR shall be permitted along routes ordinarily used
for international navigation:
in the Baltic Sea: according to the traffic separation systems in the
area of the Kypu Peninsula (Hiiumaa Island) and in the area of the Porkkala
Lighthouse;
in the Sea of Okhotsk: according to the traffic separation schemes in
the areas of Cape Aniva (Sakhalin Island) and the Fourth Kurile strait;
(Paramushirand makanrushi Islands);
in the sea of Japan: according to the traffic separation system in the
area of Cape Kril'on (Sakhalin Island).
2. The innocent passage of foreign warships through the territorial
waters (territorial sea) of the the USSR for the purpose of entering the
internal waters and ports of the USSR or of putting out therefrom to the high
seas shall be permitted only in accordance with the provisions of Part III of
the present Rules and with the use of sea lanes and traffic separation schemes
or along a route agreed in advance.
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3III. Entering and Sojourn in Internal Waters and Ports of the USSR
Article 11 Classification Qi Visits
The visits of foreign warships to internal waters and ports of the USSR
shall be subdivided into:
official visits in connection with important international or national
celebrations, when heads of states (or governments) are travelling on foreign
warships, or for the purpose of strengthening friendly relations, as well as
when states have mutually agreed to import an official character to a visic;
unofficial visits held, as a rule, for training, scientific, or other
purposes of nn unofficial character and not accompanied by especially solemn
ceremonies;
business visits, chiefly for the purposes of material-technical supply,
leisure for personnel, and the resolution of other tasks of an operational
nature.
Article ~ Grounds for Admittance
The prior guthorization of the USSR Council of Ministers shall serve as
the grounds f , 3dmittance of foreign warships in the internal waters and
ports of the VSSR unless another procedure has been provided for by
international treaties of the USSR or by decision of competent Soviet agencies
on the basis of the principle of reciprocity.
Article 12 Request for Authorization ~ Enter
Authorization for foreign warships to enter the internal waters and ports
of the USSR shall be requested through diplomatic channels not later than 30
days prior to the proposed entrance unless another procedure has been provided
for by a special agreement, with notification of the following information:
state affiliation and the number and class of warships;
purpose and character of entrance (official visit, unofficial visit,
business visit);
port of proposed visit;
proposed date of entrance and planned duration of sojourn;
names and basic measurements of warships (displacement, length, width.
draught);
rank and surname of commander of the detachment and the commander of each
warship;
total number of officers, petty officers, and rank-and-file (separately)
and a passenger list for each warhsip;
radio frequencies which the warships wish to use during the visit. as
well as information concerning the power of the radio transmitters.
Article 1i Foreign Warships For Whose Entrance Prior Authorization is
Not Required
The requirements of Articles 14 and 15 shall not extend to:
1. foreign warships wh ~ch have heads of state or governments on board
and the accompanying warship~;
2. foreign warships making a forced entrance
With respect to foreign warships specified in point I of the present
Article, prior notification ~ust be made through diplomatic chann~ls not less
than 7 days before the proposed entrance unless provided otherwise by
international treaties of the USSR.
Article lL Number Qf Foreign Warships Simultaneously Sojourning in USSR
The number of foreign warships of the same state whose simultaneous
sojourn shall be permitted in a single port of the USSR must not exceed three
unless provided otherwise in international treaties of the USSR.
Article ~ Period of Sojourn of Foreign Warships in Port of the USSR
1. The maximum period for the sojourn of each foreign warship in a port
of the USSR should not exceed 7 days unless the authorization obtained
provides otherwise.
2. In exceptional circumstanc~s a foreign warship may be asked ·t o leave
the port and limits of the territorial waters (territorial sea) of the USSR
within an established period before the time of sojourn has lapsed.
Article li Senior Marine Officer
1. The meeting of and ensuring the visit of foreign warships 1n a Soviet
port shall be organized by the senior marine officer, who shall be the
official representative of the Soviet Naval Command in the port.
2. In a port where there is no senior marine officer or a person
specially appointed to replace. him in receiving foreign warships, the duties
of the senior marine officer shall be performed by the garrison head or senior
local officer of the border guard of the USSR.
3. In garrisons where the senior marine officer is subordinate to the
garrison head, responsibility for organization of the measures provided for by
the programme of the visit shall be entrusted to the garrison head.
Article ~ Meeting Foreign Warships
1. A Soviet warship shall be sent, as a rule, to meet the foreign
warships beyond the limits of the territorial waters (territorial sea) of the
USSR. The place of the meeting shall be agreed beforehand.
2. A communications officer, who shall be the official representative of
the senior marine officer, shall be appointed for communications of the senior
marine officer with the commander of the foreign warship (or detachment).
3. The communications officer, pilot, interpreters, communicators with
means of communication, signallers, and other reception personnel shall, if
conditions allow, be put on board the foreign warship by the Soviet warship
designated for the meeting or by the pilot vessel.
4. The communications officer shall notify the commander of the foreign
warship (or detachment) about those rules and instructions specially relating
to the foreign warship and by which the commander of the foreign warship (or
detachment) must be guided during the sojourn in the Soviet port.
5. The commander of the foreign warship (or detachment) shall inform the
communications officer about all changes in information previously submitted
in accordance with Article 15 of the present Rules.
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Article II Protocol and Ceremonial During Visit Qy Foreign Warships ~
Ports Qf USSR
Protocol and ceremonial during the V1Slt by foreign warships to ports of
the USSR on official and unofficial visits and on business visits shall be
effectuated on the basis of a visit program agreed beforehand by both parties.
Article 22 Radio Communications Rules
While sojourning in the internal waters and ports of the USSR a foreign
warship may be authorized to use its radio transmitters by previous
arrangement with the competent Soviet agencies and on frequencies stipulated
beforehand.
Article 23 Place of Anchorage
The place of anchorage of a foreign warship shall be designated by the
senior marine officer and shall be notified by the communications officer to
the commander of the foreign warship (or detachment).
Articl~ 24 Shore Leave for Personnel of Foreign Warships
Shore leave for the personnel of foreign warships and all questions
connected therewith (number of persons, time of leave, time of return to the
ship, etc.) shall be resolved by the commander of the foreign warship in
agreement with the senior marine officer.
Article 25 Armed Personnel Going Ashore
1. It shall be prohibited for the personnel of foreign warships to go on
shore armed except in the instances provided for by point 2 of the present
Article and by Article 33 of the Rules.
2. Officers and non-commissioned personnel of foreign warships may go
ashore with a sidearm if the form of dress so provides.
Article 26 Allocation of Foreign Patrols
Unarmed patrols may be allocated from among the crew of foreign warships
with the authorization of the senior marine officer while their personnel are
ashore.
The places of sojourn, routes, and composition of the patrols shall be
agreed with the senior marine officer.
Article 11 Embarkation and Disembarkation of Persons Who Are Not Members
of the Crew of Foreign Warship
The embarkation on an disembarkation from a foreign warship of persons
who are not crew members shall be effectuated in the procedure determined by
the commander of the foreign ' warship (or detachment) by agreement with the
senior marine officer and with observance of the respective customs and
passport rules of the USSR.
Article 28 Customs Rules and Duties
Foreign warships in ports of the USSR shall be exempted from customs
inspection and customs duties.
There shall constitute an exception:
persons who are not crew members, if they go ashore;
goods and cargo unloaded from the ship on shore (unless an international
treaty of the USSR provides otherwise).
Aritcle 12 Sanitary Rules
1. Foreign warships in a port of the USSR must fulfill the requirements
of international medical and sanitary rules and take measures to prevent the
bringing in of contagious diseases.
2. Information concerning the sanitary state of the ship shall be
notified to the sanitary supervision representative arriving on board the ship
in the form of a Marine Sanitary Declaration.
Article 30 Floating Means Qf Foreign Warships
1. Unarmed floating means of foreign warships may move about within the
limits of the internal waters and aquatories of ports of the USSR only 1n
accordance with the laws and rules established in the USSR and the
instructions of the senior marine officer.
2. The said floating means may not be used for the carriage of armed
personnel, except for the instances provided for by Article 33 of the present
Rules.
Article 11 Charges for Services
Foreign warships shall, when navigating and sojourning in internal waters
and ports of the USSR, be exempted from the payment of port, ships, and other
charges.
Charges shall be recoverd only for the rendering of services (towage,
pilotage, and icebreaker services, etc.) and for material-technical supply
(fuel, water, provisions, electricity supply, telephone communications, etc.),
unless the arrangement is otherwise.
Article 32 Actions Which Foreign Warships Are Prohibited From Performing
in Internal Waters and Ports of the USSR
Foreign warships in the internal waters and ports of the USSR shall be
prohibited from, besides the actions specified in Article 11 of the present
Rules:
the use of radio and accoustical devices while anchored in port;
photographing and any other type of surveying of warships and of military
installations on shore;
arbitrary change in the place of anchorage or the use of port
installations or systems;
the launching into the water of persons or objects, and also any activity
under water;
any activity contrary to the laws of the USSR.
Article J1 Actions Which May be Authorized Qy. the Senior Marine Officer
The commander of a foreign warship (or detachment) may be authorized by
the senior marine officer at his request beforehand:
l7'2.l
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to perform underwater work connected with the inspection or repalr of an
underwater part of the ship's hull;
to send ashore an armed party to participate in parades or funeral
ceremonies.
IV. Forced Entrance
Article 34 Concept of Forced Entrance
By forced entrance is understood an entrance effectuated by reason of
extraordinary circumstances; wreck, natural disaster, or severe storm which
threatens the safety of the ship, drift ing ice, towage of damaged vessels,
delivery of rescued persons, the need to render urgent medical assistance to a
crew member or passenger, and also other similar instances.
Article 11 Effectuation of Forced Entrance
1. Foreign warships shall, in the event of the forced entrance into the
territorial waters (territorial sea) of the USSR, internal waters of the USSR,
or the Soviet part of frontier rivers, lakes, and other waters, be obliged to
immediately notify the administration of the nearest Soviet port thereof and,
if possible, to proceed to one of the ports open to foreign nonmilitary
vessels or to a point specified by a Soviet warship or other vessel of the
USSR sent to render assistance.
2. Upon arrival in a port of the USSR the commander of a foreign warship
shall submit to the senior marine officer, and in the absence of such in the
port, to the port administration, the following information:
the name of the warship;
the rank and surname of the commander;
the reason for the entrance;
the assistance required and nature thereof;
the proposed duration of the sojourn.
3. Upon the termination of the effect of the circumstances w.hich gave
rlse to the forced entrance, the foreign warship shall leave the waters of the
USSR after proper notification thereof to the Soviet Naval Command.
APPENDIX H
USSR Declarations no. 4604 and no. 4450 on Straight Baselines
Source: Department of State
Division of Language Services
Washington. D.C.
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f D~PARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES
(TRANSLATION)
LS NO. 113581
LB/AO
Russian
INFORY..ATION RECEIVED AT THE TH1E OF PUBLICATION
4604 U.S.S.R. Declaration
Of the baselines for measuring the breadth of the
territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental
shelf of the U.S.S.R. off the continental coast and
islands of the Pacific Ocean, the Sea of Japan, the Sea
of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea.
A decree '0 : the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers of
Fe~r~ary 7, 198~, approved'a list of geographic coordinates of
poi~~s ~j~ich cefine the positior. 0: straight baselines from which
the ~ceac~~ of the te~rito~ial sea, e~cl~sive economic zone and
co~tinental ~~el: 0: the C.S.S.R. 0:: t~e continental coas~ ~,d
is:ancs of the ?acific Ocean, ~~e Sea 0: Ja~a~, ~he Sea 0: Ok~o~sk
anc the Ee=ing Sea is ~easurec. 7~e list is publ~shec belo~.
of. geoqraphic - . .cooro':':ia-:.es
L ! S ':
of poi~ts the position
t.o r i a L sea, e xc Lus i ve e conord c zcrie (C.S.S.?. fishins zone) and
conti~cntal she2: of t~e v.s.s.? c:: t~e ~o~~~~=n~al ccas~ anc
t'
. "
LS No. 117484
LB/AO
Russian
INFORMATION RECEIVED AT THE TIME OF PUBLICATION
4450 U.S.S.R. Declaration
A decree of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers of January
15, 1985, approved a list of geographic coordinates of points
which define the position of baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and
continnental shelf of the U.S.S.R. off the continental coast
and the islands of the Artic Ocean and the Baltic and Black
Seas. The list is published below.
The same decree establishes that the waters of the White
Sea south of the line connecting Cape Svyatoy Nos with Cape
Kanin Nos, the waters of Cheshskaya Bay south of the line
connecting Cape Mikulkin with Cape Svyatoy Nos (Timanskiy), as
well as the waters of Baydaratskaya Bay southeast of the line
connecting Cape Yuribeysalya with Cape Belushiy Nos are, as
waters historically belonging to the U.S.S.R., internal waters".
Artic Ocean
Coordinates
Point Geographic Position
number
north
latitude
1 2 3
1 Boundary sign No. 415 (sea
bUOy) 69 47 41
2 Cape Nemetskiy 69 57.2
3 Islet to the east of Cape
Nemetskiy 69 57 2
4 Cape Kekurskiy 69 56 7
5 Islet to the southeast of
Cape Kekurskiy 69 56 4
. '6 Islet off Cape Lognavolok 69 "46 2
7 Islet off Cape Laush 69 44 5
Further along the line of the
lowest tide to point 10
east
longitude
4
30 49 15
31 56.7
31 57.2
32 03.5
32 05.4
32 57.4
33 04.8
APPENDIX I
1983 Presidential Proclamation of the EEZ of the United States.
and Presidential Statement
Sources:
1. The 1983 Proclamation:
'EEZ Papers. 84 Oceans;
Oceans '84 Converence Proceedings by NOAA.
Ocean Assessment Division; (Rockville. Maryland 20852);
September 1984; 149 pages; insert.
2. Presidential Statement:
Vandyke. Jon M. (ed.): Consensus and Confrontation: The
United States and the Law of the Sea. (1984). A workshop
of the Law of the Sea Institute. January 9-13. 1984.
Published by the Law of the Sea Institute. University of
Hawaii (Honolulu). 554 pages; at p. 551-553.
100
Proclamatioa 6030 of March 10. 19l1S
Exclusive Economic Zooe of the United States of America
By the President of the United States of America
A Proclamation
WHEREAS the Government of the United States of America desires to
facilitate the wise development and use of the oceans consistent With interna-
tionallaw;
WHEREAS international law recognizes that in a zone beyond its territory
and adjacent to its territorial sea, known as the Exclusive Economic Zone, a
coastal State may assert certain sovereign rights over natural resources and
related jurisdiction: and
WHEREAS the establishment of an Exclusive Economic Zone by the United
States will advance the development of ocean resources and promote the
protection of the marine environment while not affecting other lawful uses of
the zone. including the freedoms of navigation and overflight. by other States;
NOW, THEREFORE. I. RONALD REAGAN , by the authority vested in me as
President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, do
hereby proclaim the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the United States of
America and confirm also the rights and freedoms of all States within an
Exclusive Economic Zone. as described herein.
The Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States is a zone contiguous to the
territorial sea. including zones contiguous to the territorial sea of the United
States. the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands (to the extent consistent with the Covenant and the United
Nations Trusteeship Agreement), and United States overseas territories and
possessions. The Exclusive Economic Zone extends to a distance 200 nautical
miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured. In cases where the maritime boundary with a neighboring State
remains to be determined. tile boundary of the Exclusive Economic Zone shall
be determined by the United States and other State concerned in accordance
with equitable principles.
Within the Exclusive Economic Zone. the United States has. to the extent
permitted by intemational law. [a] sovereign rights for the purpose of explor-
ing, exploiting. conserving and managing natural resources. both living and
non-living, of the seabed and subsoil and the superjacent waters and with
regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the
zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds:
and (b) jurisdiction with regard to the establishment and use of artificial
islands. and installations and structures having economic purposes. and the
protection and preservation of the marine environment.
This Proclamation does not change existing United States policies concerning
the continental shelf, marine mammals and fisheries. including highly migra-
tory species of tuna which are not subject to United States jurisdiction and
require international agreements for effective management
The United States will exercise these sovereign rights and jurisdiction in
accordance with the rules of international law.
Without prejudice to the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the United States.
the Exclusive Economic Zone remains an area beyond the territory and
territorial sea of the United States in which all States enjoy the high seas
freedoms of navigation. overflight. the laying of submarine cables and pipe-
lines. and other internationally lawful uses of the sea.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. I have hereunto set my hand this tenth day of
March. in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-three. and of the
Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and seventh.
[1) The United States has long been a leader in
developing customary and conventional law of the sea.
Our objectives have consistently been to provide a
legal order that will, among other things, facilitate
peaceful, international uses of the oceans and provide
for equitable and effective management and conservation
of marine resources. The United States also recognizes
that all nations have an interest in these issues.
(2) Last July I announced that the United States
will not sign the UN Law of the Sea Convention that was
opened for signature on December 10. We have taken
this step because several major problems in the
convention's deep seabed mining provisions are contrary
to the interests and principles of industrialized
nations and would not help attain the aspirations of
developing countries.
(3) The United States does not stand alone in
those concerns. Some important allies and friends have
not signed the convention. Even some signatory states
have raised concerns about these problems.
(4) However, the convention also contains
provisions with respect to traditional uses of the
oceans which generally confirm existing maritime law
and practice and fairly balance the interests of all
states.
(5) Today I am announcing three decisions to
promote and protect the oceans interests of the United
States in a manner consistent with those fair and
bal anced resul ts in the convention and interna tional
law.
(6) First, the United States is prepared to
accept and act in accordance with the balance of
interests relating to traditional uses of the
oceans--such as navigation and overflight. In this
respect, the United States will recognize the rights of
other states in the waters off their coasts, as
reflected in the convention, so long as the rights and
freedoms of the United States and others under
international law are recognized by such coastal
states.
(7) Second, the United States will exercise and
assert its navigation and overflight rights and
freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is
consistent with the balance of interests ref Lect.e d in
the convention. The United States will not, however,
acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed
to restrict the rights and freedoms of the
international community in nav igation and overflight
and other related high seas uses.
(8) Third, I am proclaiming today an exclusive
economic zone in which the United States will exercise
sovereign rights in living and nonliving resources
within 200 nautical miles of its coast. This will
provide U.S. jurisdiction for mineral resources out to
200 nautical miles that are not on the Continental
Shelf. Recently discovered deposits there could be an
important future source of strategic minerals.
(9) Within this zone all nations will continue to
enj oy the high seas rights and freedoms that are not
resource related, including the freedoms of navigation
and overflight. My proclamation does not change exist-
ing U.S. policies concerning the Continental Shelf
marine mammals, and fisheries, including highly migra-
tory species of tuna which are not subject to U. S.
jurisdiction. The United States will continue efforts
to achieve international agreements for the ef fective
management of these species. The proclamation al so
reinforces this government I s policy of promoting the
U.S. fishing industry.
(10) While international law provides for a right
of jurisdiction over marine scientific research within
such a zone, the proclamation does not assert this
right. I have elected not to do so because of the U.S.
interest in encouraging marine scientific research and
avoiding any unnecessary burdens. The United States
will, nevertheless, recognize the right of other
coastal states to exercise jurisdiction over marine
scientific research within 200 nautical miles of their
coasts, if that jurisdiction is exercised reasonably in
a manner consistent with international law.
[11) The exclusive economic zone established
today will also enable the United States to take limi-
ted additional steps to protect the marine environment.
In this connection, the United States will continue to
work through the International Maritime Organization
and other appropriate international organizations to
develop uniform international measures for the protec-
tion of the marine environment while imposing no unrea-
sonable burdens on commercial shipping.
(12) The policy decisions I am announcing today
will not affect the application of existing U.S. law
concerning the high seas or existing authorities of any
U.S. Government agency.
(13) In addition to the above policy steps, the
United States will continue to work with other coun-
tries to develop a regime, free of unnecessary politi-
cal and economic restraints, for mining deep seabed
minerals beyond national jurisdiction. Deep seabed
mining remains a lawful exercise of the freedom of the
high seas open to all nations. The United States will
continue to allow its firms to explore for and, when
the market permits, exploit these resources.
(14) The Administration looks forward to working
with the Congress on legislation to implement these new
policies.
APPENDIX J
Canada's Acceptance of ICJ's Compulsory Jurisdiction
Source: International Legal Material. vol. XXXIV. no. 6.
November 1985. at p. 1729-1730.
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CANADA: ACCEPTANCE OF I.C.J. COMPULSORY JURISDICTION
WITH REGARD TO DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS*
[September 10, 1985]
'U:'.iT.:.' 111.'T m zrrt m t .,..4!ti..s e-t an of ~.:m:tb:l
to tj~£ ~tni...tcb '.l\atUma
Dear Secretary-General:
1fn .,..~uHnan ':Pcnnn.ru-r...tr ~:.: ([~:1:-..bn.
n.t:.;r-"cg ~ .e g ~u..t irrrt s '}..tnU l3
On behalf of t~e Government of Canada,
(1) I give notice that I hereby t e r mi n a t e the acceptance by
Canada of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice hitherto ef:ectiJe by virtue of the
declaration made on 7 April 1970 in conformity wit~
paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of that Court.
(2) I declare that the Gover'1ment of Canada accepts as
compulsory ipso facto and without special convention, on
condition of reciprocity, t~e j~risdiction of the
International Court of Justice, in confor~ity with
paragraph 2 of Article 36 of t~e Statute of t~e Court,
until such time as notice may be given to terminate t~e
acceptance, over all disputes arising after the present
declaration with regard to sit~ations or facts sUbseq~ent
to this declaration, other than:
Ca) disputes in regard to which parties have agreed
or shall agree to have recourse to some other
method of peaceful settlement;
H.E. Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar
Secretary-General
United Nations
New York
*[Reproduced from the text provided by the Canadian Embassy,
Washington, D.C.
[Canada's declaration of April 7, 1970, appears at 9 I.L.H. 598
(1970). The above notice is identical with that declaration except
that paragraph (2) (d) has been de1e~ed., T~at.pa~agraph reads:
"disputes arising out of or concernLng_JurLsdLctLon or rights claim-
ed or exercised by Canada in respect or the conservation, management
or exploitation of the liying re~ou~ces of the s~a, or in respect of
the prevention or control of ?~l~utlo~ or~contamLnation of the marine
. t' arine areas adJacent ,-0 t ..e coast of Canada." This
enVLronmen ~n m l' ~o larger]
reservation, consequently, al?l? les.. _.. .
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(b) disputes with the Government of any other
country which is a member of the commonwealth,
all of which disputes shal l be settled in such
manner as the parties have agreed or shall agree:
(c) disputes with regard to questions which by inter-
national law fall exclusively within the jurisdiction
of Canada.
(]) The Government of Canada also reserves the right at any
time, by means of a notification addressed to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, and with effect
as from the moment of such notification, either to add to,
amend or withdraw any of the foregoing reservations, or
any that may hereafter be added.
It is requested that this notification may be communicated to
the governments of all the States that have accepted the
Optional Clause and to the Registrar of the International Court
of Justice.
Wew York, September la, 1985
S t e phen Le wi s
Ambassador and
Permanent Representative
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